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Abstract 
As effects of social and environmental conflicts perpetuate globally, fewer nations in the 
world appear to be at settled peace.   The on-set of natural disasters and socio-political conflicts 
continue to force the United States Government to be increasingly called upon to provide 
resources that secure instable regions during times of conflict.   One method the government uses 
to securing its international neighbors is through the deployment of US Army reconstruction 
teams.   These teams assist in transforming a negatively impacted foreign nation into a peaceful 
and functioning sovereignty within itself and its region; however, in order to begin 
reconstruction and engage in long term stability for the best interest of the host-nation, the Army 
must scrutinize current decision-making techniques to assure that basic human rights are instilled 
and local inhabitants have a means to sustain those efforts. 
This research sets out to define a planning model which supplements Army doctrine 
concerning post-conflict reconstruction, mainly FM 3-07 Stability Operations.   It looks to 
incorporate academia, professional experience, and government resources with indigenous 
leadership in order to define a process to reconstruct infrastructure for a foreign nation during a 
time of need.   More importantly, it looks to enforce those measures which endorse the basic 
human rights of society to instill security in post-conflict regions.
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
“The world of suffering people looks to us for leadership.  Their thoughts, however, are 
not concentrated alone on this problem.  They have more immediate and terribly pressing 
concerns where the mouthful of food will come from, where they will find shelter tonight, and 
where they will find warmth.  Along with the great problem of maintaining the peace we must 
solve the problem of the pittance of food, of clothing and coal and homes.  Neither of these 
problems can be solved alone.” 
-George C.  Marshall, November 1945 
 
As effects of social and environmental conflicts perpetuate globally, fewer nations in the 
world appear to be at settled peace.  The on-set of natural disasters and socio-political conflicts 
continue to force the United States Government (USG) to be increasingly called upon to provide 
resources that sustain and enhance the livelihood of the international community during 
detrimental times.  One method the USG uses to securing its international neighbors in these 
circumstances involves deploying US Army reconstruction teams.  The names given to these 
units have evolved throughout the years, but all are centered on assets of trained personnel who 
have the ability to exploit various resources to reconstruct social and infrastructure needs in order 
to reinstate an incapacitated post-conflict society.   
As of now, the primary methods to initiate reconstruction efforts through US Army 
organizations are implemented by policy; and consist of programs such as Commander 
Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to units such as Civil Affairs (CA), Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT), and US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).  These methods 
contribute to reconstruction efforts with a principal mission to uphold – provide stability to a 
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region which is experiencing decentralized authority as a result of some type of conflict (US 
Army, 2007).  As part of the techniques for stabilizing post-conflict areas, reconstruction teams 
initiate tasks that restore and improve dysfunctional social and infrastructure conditions.  These 
efforts are mitigated through political policy and are accomplished through the provision of 
materials, trained personnel, land development, human-rights improvement, economic 
development procedures, and government empowerment.  The assessment and reconstruction of 
infrastructure accomplishes these provisions by reconstituting broken transportation networks, 
education systems, building medical clinics and providing services, creating community centers, 
and reconstructing government buildings (US Army, 2008). 
While the goals of reconstruction teams were developed to support national security 
objectives, global development, and the welfare of international inhabitants, the decision-making 
methods they employ are considered, by some, to be overtly deficient.  As a result, criticisms by 
internal, foreign, and non-governmental organizations (NGO) plague the reconstruction 
community and challenge their effectiveness.  In fact, criticisms of the Department of Defense 
(DOD), a key player in the post-conflict reconstruction community, is perceived as inadequate to 
adapt to changes in the „conflict landscape‟ of the 21st Century (Federovich, 2009).  Without the 
ability to adapt and be flexible, the resources the DOD employs are not effectively utilized, and 
fall short of accomplishing reconstruction effort objectives.  Furthermore, sources point out that 
NGOs criticize that the utilization of reconstruction teams, specifically PRTs, are not clearly 
mandated, and personnel are untrained on how and what types of assistance to deliver (Stapleton, 
2003).  Therefore, when organizations such as the US Army are deployed, they lack an effective 
planning process and cannot instigate appropriate reconstruction measures.  Their primary 
objectives of stabilization become increasingly difficult tasks because the source of leadership is 
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not reasonably proficient in deliberating needed agendas. In turn, their efforts may further 
complicate post-conflict situations, and especially so when host-nation inhabitants perceive that 
redevelopment of critical infrastructure is not prioritized or evenly and fairly balanced.   
But criticism of reconstruction teams is only the first step towards changing how the US 
Army conducts reconstruction efforts in post-conflict societies; and defining who is responsible 
for leading that change becomes an entanglement of governmental bureaucracy beyond the scope 
of this work.  Arguably, criticisms of reconstruction teams are not as important as the criticism of 
the planning model these teams employ (or the lack of a planning model).   
In defense of the Army, Army doctrine is routinely examined and assessed for 
effectiveness.  US Army advanced military schools, such as The Army War College and The 
Command and General Staff College, task students to reproach current doctrine for modernity.  
As so, doctrine for restoring foreign nations is highly criticized by academia professionals and 
subject matter experts, in order to create information about the environments reconstruction 
teams may expect if deployed.  This doctrine generally supports the characteristics of rebuilding 
the physical and social environment of a post-conflict society for the primary intention of 
securing and stabilizing a region.  None-the-less, what is missing from US Army doctrine are not 
the characteristics of international reconstruction, but a coherent international reconstruction 
planning model which invests in the best interest of the host-nation and can be transposed 
through rotating leadership.   
If such a model existed, it would consist of a planning process that is focused upon 
assessed needs, one which is flexible and adaptable, that is political and culturally oriented, 
inclusive of local leadership, and „fair and balanced‟ among the host-nation population.  The 
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guiding doctrine the Army uses to accommodating these characteristics can be found in the Field 
Manual (FM) 3-07 Stability Operations
1
.  As documented in Appendix C of FM 3-07, the Army 
utilizes the characteristics of USAID‟s Principles for Reconstruction and Development2doctrine 
for considerations when reconstruction efforts in host-nations occur.  However, a concern is that 
Appendix C is only referenced one time in the main body of the manual, of which the importance 
of implementing „ownership‟ is implied.  Therefore, if during the rebuilding of a post-conflict 
society these principles do not mesh with leadership decision-making processes, US Army 
reconstruction teams can expect challenges and criticism to continue to degrade the value of their 
efforts and the external perception that their presence contributes to further instability. 
Recent overview of the Reconstruction Team  
The September 11, 2001 attacks on America has etched into history books a point in 
which USG policies and methods have been through an exorbitant cycle of examinations, 
modifications, and updates.  Until recently, in-depth looks into doctrine for international aid and 
reconstruction seems to have taken a “back seat” to the priority of reorganizing the intelligence 
field and making it more effective.  Evidence of this comes from the 911 National Commission 
report, Organizing America's Defenses in the United States.  This prime objective entails 
reorganizing the intelligence community in such a way as to protect the American people 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004) through better 
                                                 
1
 FM 3-07 is a‟ new approach‟ to how the US Army conducts operations which are devised to stabilize and 
secure a nation in conflict.  This approach is associated by a „whole of government‟ collaborative process.  The 
manual is designed to embrace the doctrine and resources of other USG organizations in order to create a „unity of 
effort‟ to stabilizing a nation. 
2
The USAID principles are as follows: Accountability, Partnership, Assessment, Sustainability, Selectivity, 
Flexibility, Ownership, Results, and Capacity Building.  A brief, and official, description is offered in 
Appendix A - USAID Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development. 
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processes and flow of information and policy.  It emphasizes the immediate need to creating and 
restructuring organizations, military included, to enforce domestic protection; which, 
understandably, surpassed the need to overhaul strategies for distributing reconstruction and aid 
to international communities during a post-conflict event. 
In any case, reconstruction would eventually become a major component into the global 
perspective of how the US Army would shape global security.  Beginning in 2002 after major 
social, political, and combative conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US became increasingly 
tasked to reconstitute functioning government organizations and rebuild the physical 
infrastructure.  Reconstruction teams, in these theaters of conflict, evolved through many labels 
before being coined the popularized Provincial Reconstruction Team
3
.  As with a majority of 
reconstruction teams, PRTs consist of joint civil-military personnel.  They were first deployed to 
Gardez, Afghanistan in 2002 and operated as a function to: 1) improve security; 2) extend the 
reach of the [Afghan] government; and 3) facilitate reconstruction in the provinces (USAID, 
2010).  These functions are known as operational boundaries and were adopted to increase 
stability in the region and initiate host-nation empowerment.  They are considered the 
fundamental components in which reconstruction teams still operate around the world today.   
                                                 
3
 According to a 2005 Report to Congress entitled The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, 
Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities, in JAN2003 National Security Presidential Directives #24 developed a 
temporary reconstruction team, known as the Office of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance, controlled by 
DOD leadership.  By MAY 2003, the OHRA would become the CPA; however, by JUN2004 all CPA operations 
stopped, making way for Commander Emergency Response Funds and PRTs to function as the main mechanisms 
for rebuilding.  Thus, the PRT has carried many names, but remains true to the function of reconstituting post-
conflict societies. 
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While the security objectives of reconstruction missions have been consistent, there have 
been major transitions in deciding the best civil-military balance of these teams.  Challenges in 
political leadership arises in deciding who is the more capable resource for rebuilding – civilians 
or the military.  What resulted was the National Security Presidential Directive #36 of 
11MAY2004, which transitioned Iraqi reconstruction team efforts from DOD control to 
Department of State (DOS) control.  With this policy, all US Army reconstruction teams become 
influenced by civilian experiences, resources, and knowledge.  The method of using civilians is 
most likely a result of the vast assets the USG employs to accomplish its goals.  Civilians 
provide expertise and perspectives unique of non-combatant oriented professionals.  Since the 
PRT is currently the most common vehicle to large-scale reconstruction in post-conflict 
situations, understanding its composition and leadership hierarchy provides a background in the 
operational environment and the utilization of the civil-military approach for other reconstruction 
teams.  A thorough look at the PRT gives a glimpse of what the organizational environment 
looks like and prepares an overview of reconstruction team management.   
Formation of a PRT 
As previously mentioned, the DOD to DOS switch in leadership has trickled mainly into 
the functions of PRTs; however, there is a much more significant impact of this change than just 
organizational development.  Mission objectives of PRTs are now created through civilian 
subject matter experts in humanitarian aid, reconstruction and international development, 
community development, host-nation empowerment, and supplemented with military 
professionals.  This change in leadership offers a perspective which is not militaristically based, 
but rather steers decision-making based political policy and US national objectives.  This change 
has produced how elements of PRTs operate within a society and have evolved their actions to 
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be more inclusive of host-nation representation.  In fact, given this new organizational model, 
USAID has listed three major operational components of PRTs, as follows (USAID, 2010): 
1. A PRT typically consists of 60-250 military personnel, a 
USAID field officer and a DOS political officer.   Many also 
have a USDA advisor.   
2. PRTs do not engage in combat operations; however, they 
retain robust force-protection capabilities that are used to 
facilitate the work of civilian representatives.   
3. PRT projects include: community and government 
buildings, clinics, schools, capacity building for 
government, radio stations, gender activities, agriculture, 
water/irrigation projects, energy (micro-power), and roads 
projects. 
 
These components offer an official summary of the composition of a PRT and some of 
their main efforts.  The first component illustrates the formation of the key players, while the 
second emphasizes operational boundaries, and the third specifies PRT construction projects.  
Combined, these efforts are designed to help shape and empower host-nation communities for 
long term, stable, effects. 
The composition of a PRT is not only formed through various civilian and military 
personnel, it consists of inter-agency personnel, and contractors.  FM 3-07 breaks the force 
structure of a typical PRT into distinguishable organizational responsibilities, as demonstrated in 
Table  1-1. 
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Table  1-1: PRT Organizational Structure. 
PRT Occupational 
Title 
USG Organization 
PRT Team Leader DOS 
Deputy Team Leader DOD - Senior Military Officer 
Multinational Force 
Liaison Officer 
DOD - Senior Military Officer 
Rule of Law Coordinator Dept.  of Justice 
Provincial Action Officer DOS 
Public Diplomacy Officer DOS 
Agriculture Advisor USDA 
Engineer DOD - Army Corps of Engineers 
Development Officer USAID 
Governance Team USAID Contractors 
Civil Affairs Team DOD - US Army Civil Affairs 
Bilingual Biculture Advisor DOD - Contractors 
Source: FM 3-07. 
The occupation titles and their descriptions have been briefed in Appendix B - PRT 
Occupational Functions per guidance from FM 3-07 and the PRT Playbook SEP 07.  The PRT 
Team Leader has inclusive authority, followed by the Deputy Team Leader; all other positions 
are equivalent in authority. This organization creates a „whole of government‟ approach which is 
routinely emphasized in FM 3-07. The whole of government is fostered through FM 3-07 as the 
current method to reconstructing post-conflict societies. It emphasizes multi-disciplinary, inter-
agency, and civil-military joint operations and represents current allocated leadership per 
Presidential guidance.  
  9 
Operational Setting 
US Army reconstruction teams do not function as conventional combat forces, but are 
still considered force multipliers which promote stability through the guidance from FM 3-07.  
These teams compliment defensive/offensive operations by utilizing the resources needed to 
improve the capacity of the host-nation to provide internal security through the reconstruction of 
infrastructure which may be needed for force protection
4
 (Baker, 2007).  It can be shown that 
infrastructure projects improve community empowerment by validating host-nation government 
which can create methods for local assets to be exercised.   
A recent example of this process is illustrated through a community in a mountainous 
region of Afghanistan, which was coexisting with an insurgency (Taliban) stronghold.  In 2010, 
the only route which leads to this community was blocked by a severe snow drifts.  Community 
leaders were prohibited from exercising local authority because they were cut off from the 
support needed from the provincial government.  Reconstruction teams, specifically the PRT, 
assessed the situation and began to employ local workers to re-establish the transportation 
network which led to the community.  This project cleared the blocked route and allowed 
coalition and Afghan forces to reconnect with the community and reinstate the governing body.  
The efforts of the PRT resulted in the locals‟ claiming that they will “…no longer tolerate a 
Taliban presence in the valley and would fight to protect future reconstruction and development 
efforts” (USAID, 2010c).   
                                                 
4
 DOD Joint Publication 1-02 defines force protection as “Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile 
actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical 
information.  Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or 
disease.” 
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This simple endeavor illustrates how a reconstruction team functions progressively and in 
favor of the host-nation population.  These types of  actions are aligned with the reconstruction 
team mandate “…to pave the way for a gradual transition from an environment where 
international military forces are necessary to an environment in which Afghan national and sub-
national government institutions are soundly established and fully functioning, with PRTs in turn 
progressively becoming unnecessary” (Provincial Reconstruction Team Executive Steering 
Committee, 2008).  The mandate does not proclaim the use of reconstruction team efforts to 
overpower enemy forces with the use of combative firepower; but to reconstitute local 
governance through community empowerment. Even though these reconstruction teams are 
comprised of military assets which are needed to protect themselves and host-nation counterparts 
during attacks, part of their main efforts are to prevent hostilities that challenge the future of 
stability operations in the host-nation (US Army, 2007).  The PRT mandate, mentioned above, is 
an example of policy which guides the fortitude of reconstruction teams.  It emphasizes the use 
of methods to “pave the way” to host-nation interdependency while setting the groundwork for 
reconstruction operations. 
Examples of a Reconstruction Team’s Assignments 
As a result of the immeasurable reconstruction team impact, Table  1-2 was created to 
illustrate one PRT operation.  Located in Zabul, Afghanistan, the operations of this team are 
current as of JUN2010.  It is chosen for this study because of the dynamic nature of the social 
and physical projects with which it is involved.  The team, known as the Zabul PRT, embraces 
reconstruction principles and mandates by implementing projects which represent interests of 
human-rights, community development, and local government empowerment.  This team 
attempts to revitalize Zabul Province by combining planning, security, and social techniques 
  11 
with principles that tie in the best interest of the area.  Health, safety, and welfare considerations 
can be found in these projects, and more importantly, they appear to be well balanced among the 
population. 
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Table  1-2: Zabul Afghanistan Current PRT Projects. 
Province, Country PRT Project 
Zabul, Afghanistan 
(current as of 16JUN2010) 
Creating a Women's Park for local women to 
commune and mentor children 
Bridge Reconstruction 
Trash Services 
Hospital Improvements 
Perimeter Wall Repairs 
School Construction 
Emergency Road Repairs 
Irrigation Wells 
Nursery Security Upgrades 
Source: Tech. Sgt. Oshawn Jefferson, U.S AFCENT Combat Camera Team (2010). 
 
The Zabul projects are clear mechanisms into reconstituting a local host-nation 
government.  The progress and outcome of the projects can yet be determined; however, it 
appears that principles of assessment are in line with the PRT leadership‟s decision-making and 
planning process.  Future studies into the methods of assessment, selectivity, and results would 
be needed for conclusive results.  The example provided is only offered to give the reader 
context into how reconstruction teams operate in post-conflict societies and what sorts of 
projects are occurring. 
Primary Research Question 
Does policy oriented US Army post-conflict reconstruction efforts sustain the well-being 
and security of the host-nation population? 
Secondary Research Questions 
1. Does the US Army need a model for reconstruction efforts 
in foreign nations? 
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2. How does FM 3-07 compare to the rational comprehensive 
planning process? 
a. What aspects of FM 3-07 and the 
comprehensive planning process can be 
adapted to construct a post-conflict 
reconstruction planning model? 
3. What are the key reconstruction challenges for local host-
nation communities emerging from a conflict? 
4. What would a post-conflict reconstruction planning model look like to 
supplement current US Army doctrine FM 3-07? 
Significance of this Study 
The significance of this study has evolved from a desire to positively impact the lives of 
those who struggle during difficult times, to developing a framework the US Army uses to 
ensure appropriate methods are employed for positive impacts in post-conflict societies.  In as 
much, the significance can be categorized into altruistic reasoning and rational reasoning; but in 
both, this study examines the requirement for reconstruction teams to act decisively for the well-
being of a suffering population. 
Altruistic Reasoning 
First and foremost, the significance of this study is founded in humanistic values
5
.  The 
altruistic nature of this assertion suggests that furthering advancements in US Army post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts will primarily benefit the host-nation populace, with residual effects of 
                                                 
5 Psychologist Abraham Maslow has defined the five Humanistic Values.  As relevant to this study, two of 
the values are described below: 
 A belief in the worth of persons and dedication to the development of human potential.   
 A recognition of the profound problems affecting our world and a responsibility to hope and 
constructive change 
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benefiting the global community in security measures.   It declares that all life deserves respect 
and has the inherent right to live without the constraints of oppression.  To further the point of 
altruism, investigating ways to improve the impact of reconstruction in post-conflict 
environments will save lives.  It provides the means to rebuild the infrastructure necessary to 
protect occupants of the host-nations health, safety, and welfare.  It is in hopes that proper 
planning models will account for protecting ethnic minorities, women and children, the elderly, 
and the disabled.  A final altruistic explanation involves the military‟s ethical obligation to 
understanding the importance of compassion and the pursuit of excellence.  Table  1-3 is a 
synopsis of the DODs Joint Ethical Regulations and describes these characteristics.  They can be 
seen as the motivational source to a leader‟s duty.  While each leader is bounded by his or her 
leadership and mission objectives, these codes provide the foundational characteristics for 
concern about the welfare of the foreign nations and their inhabitants.  These codes also signify 
why accomplishment is measured by positive impacts, rather than monetary investments and 
expenditures.  This altruistic significance, therefore, is based upon the US Army‟s leadership 
ability to enhance and protect the livelihoods of those who are limited in means to fend for 
themselves during times of conflict. 
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Table ‎1-3: Joint Ethical Regulations Synopsis.   
Department of Defense 
Joint Ethical Regulations 
Code Definition 
Ch12, Sec5, f - Caring 
Compassion is an essential element of 
good government.  Courtesy and 
kindness, both to those we serve and 
to those we work with, help to ensure 
that individuals are not treated solely 
as a means to an end.  Caring for 
others is the counterbalance against 
the temptation to pursue the mission 
at any cost. 
Ch12, Sec5, j - Pursuit of 
Excellence 
In public service, competence is only 
the starting point.   DOD employees 
are expected to set an example of 
superior diligence and commitment.   
They are expected to be all they can be 
and to strive beyond mediocrity. 
Source: DOD Joint Ethical Regulations (2010). 
Rational Reasoning 
While altruism plays a significant impact into this study, there are other meaningful 
reasons to why a planning model for post-conflict reconstruction efforts is valuable to the US 
Army.  Chiefly, this is because there are no standardizations that guide how reconstruction teams 
operate (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008).  To reinforce this claim, Abbaszadeh et al. states, “While 
pragmatically accepting the necessary variance in PRT operations across nations, greater 
standardization is needed to provide international partners with common goals and objectives, as 
well as examples of best practices” (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008).  Abbaszadeh et al. acknowledges 
the support needed to create doctrine with consistency.  Part of the solution to this claim is to 
support a planning model which guides the actions of reconstruction teams and can be revisited 
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through rotating leadership.  In this argument, a planning model for reconstruction efforts would 
become a foundational source in which the US Army and reconstruction team community can 
create guidelines.  It would be a model based on the ethical charge to support host-nation 
interests, and exercise measurable progress. 
In conjunction with standardization issues of reconstruction teams, Lieutenant Colonel 
(LTC) George P. McDonnell points out that the US Army‟s current FM 3-07 Stability 
Operations doctrine, of which the PRT is outlined in Appendix F, is insufficient to build a 
common source of operating guidelines (McDonnell, 2009).  Specifically LTC McDonnell 
quotes: 
“Unfortunately, as a doctrine to establish ‘a common frame of 
reference including intellectual tools that Army leaders use to 
solve military problems,’6 the appendix falls short.  In promoting a 
‘mutual understanding and in enhanc[ing] effectiveness,’7 the 
appendix is weakened by omissions and ambiguity.  Shortcomings 
appear in both principal sections of the appendix.” 
 
This statement emphasizes further evidence of the need for standardization, but also provides 
constructive criticism of current doctrine.  While standardization is a relevant issue, the need to 
examine and improve current US Army doctrine should become a priority in order to improve 
operational effectiveness and the commander‟s intent. 
                                                 
6
 Quoted from: U.S.  Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, February 2008), D-1. 
7
 Quoted from: U.S.  Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, February 2008), D-1. 
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While the significance of this study embraces the need for standardization, the most 
empowering effect is to begin rectifying a well-known issue through-out our government.  In 2008, 
the US House of Representative – Committee on Armed Services (HASC) investigated 
reconstruction team services.  In this report are listed several justifications to examining 
reconstruction efforts, specifically the PRT.  Among the items for reconstruction teams to address are 
(US House of Representatives, 2008): 
 PRT planning and operations started in an ad hoc manner and 
remain decentralized. 
 There have not been articulated clear reconstruction 
objectives. 
 There are no measures to effectively evaluate [reconstruction 
teams] performance. 
 CENTCOM has not actively provided PRT guidance. 
 Major issues acquired by HASC include: 
o Mission objectives 
o Leadership 
o Funding 
o Staffing 
o Measuring effectiveness 
o Leveraging partnerships 
 There is no clear definition of the PRT mission, concept of 
operations or doctrine, and no standard operating procedures. 
 There is no comprehensive strategy or common framework.   
 
The importance of the report signifies a need to centralize the USG reconstruction 
objectives.  This can be done by unifying standard doctrine and creating frameworks for actions 
on objectives.  Objectionably, CENTCOM, which falls under DOD authority, is perceived as not 
promoting the needed guidance from which PRTs operate.  Therefore, exploring a decision-
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making model for reconstruction efforts to supplement US Army doctrine is deemed as 
necessary by Congress.   
Assumption 
The assumption of this study suggests that future USG reconstruction efforts will require 
the support of US Army assets. 
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Acronyms 
Table  1-4: Acronyms. 
ANA Afghan National Army 
CENTCOM Central Command 
CERP Commanders Emergency Response Program 
CPA Coalition Provincial Authority 
DOD Department of Defense 
DOS Department of State 
ETT Embedded Training Team 
FM Army Field Manual 
GIS Geographic Information Systems 
HASC US House of Representative Armed Service Committee 
IHRC Interim Haiti Recovery Commission 
IMS Interagency Management System 
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff 
LTC Lieutenant Colonel 
LST Logistic Support Team 
MDMP Military Decision Making Process 
NGO Non-governmental Organization 
NOW National Organization for Women Foundation 
NSPD National Security Presidential Directive 
OEF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 
OHRA Office of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance 
OIF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
OOTW  Operations Other Than War 
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 
SWOT Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threats 
UN United Nations 
US United States 
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers 
USDA Department of Agriculture 
USG United States Government 
WWII World War II 
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Limitations 
The chief limitation of this study relies on conclusions which are dependent upon theories 
and doctrine of social organization, the urban planning model, and principals of reconstruction 
and foreign assistance.  This limits the ability to rely on logical and practiced theories which are 
inherent to post-conflict international reconstruction efforts.  Also, because of the extreme 
complexity, array, and lack of reconstruction guidelines, developing an international planning 
model for reconstruction efforts can only be speculative.  There has been very modest 
documentation into planning models of this nature, as the primary focus seems to be on 
international reconstruction criticism.   
  21 
 
CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review 
“Plans are nothing; planning is everything.”  
-General Dwight D. Eisenhower 
While today‟s soldiers are much more sophisticated then what the highly popularized 
term “grunt” allures, there will always be situations in which soldiers endure intellectual 
challenges more so than physical challenges .  US Army soldiers are better trained, better 
equipped, and more capable of handling the collection of dynamic and challenging environments 
in which they operate then they have ever been.  This preparedness is a direct result of the 
doctrine used to train and guide decisions during operations.  While an ill-prepared soldier will 
create ill effects, the professional soldier will accumulate the skills necessary in order to 
reproduce the desired results of his or her leadership.  With that being said the soldier who 
doesn‟t apply himself physically and academically, will be the one who compromises the safety 
of his team and those who are associated with him.  In this, the need to understand current post-
conflict reconstruction doctrine and methods reflects the matter of achieving progressive 
reconstruction objectives and having a positive impact on the welfare of the host-nation. 
The primary doctrine for reconstruction efforts of US Army leadership is FM 3-07 
Stability Operations.  It provides the “operational guidance for commanders and trainers” and is 
the “Army‟s approach to the conduct of full spectrum operations in any environment across the 
spectrum of conflict” (iv).  In summary, FM 3-07 is the Army‟s “bible” to conduct 
reconstruction training exercises and missions, in describing operational environments during the 
efforts of rebuilding a post-conflict “at-risk” community in a foreign nation, and is the source of 
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which other US army reconstruction doctrine evolves.  FM 3-07 was released to the US Army in 
2008 and represents a collection of methods to transition a nation of conflict to one of peace; 
specifically, it embodies basic procedures to rebuilding physical and social infrastructure.  Being 
that this doctrine is a recent release, there are no studies of how guidelines from FM 3-07 have 
been applied to post-conflict areas, or comprehensive studies to its effect; however, it is the point 
of this literature review to provide a summary of noteworthy actions of historical and recent 
efforts to illustrate four objectives: 1) the dynamic environment and challenges in the atmosphere 
of which reconstruction teams operate; 2) the impact of transforming reconstruction policy and 
descriptions of FM 3-07 methodologies; 3) issues of culture, and social and physical 
infrastructure and their impact on development; and 4) the assessment of basic human rights
8
 and 
the conditions required to improve them. 
This literature review exemplifies the reconstruction team process, its historical and 
current context, and acts as a reference for the process of conducting reconstruction efforts.  It 
surveys government, academic, public, and military documentation in order to set-up conditions 
for a potential reconstruction planning model on which US Army doctrine can be based upon.  It 
begins by analyzing post WWI reconstruction and the influence of USG policy as the decision 
making factor for these efforts. It further investigates the impact of USG policy of Somalia 
reconstruction intentions of the 1990s, and follows by illustrating current USACE reconstruction 
efforts in Haiti. Finally, an in-depth review of the impact of reconstruction policy on 
                                                 
8
 The United Nations has created the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which can be found in 
Appendix C - United Nations Declaration of Human Rights).  This declaration is added to give context to the most 
basic and fundamental description of what all people deserve has human beings, as agreed upon by the UN.   
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OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) will 
be explained to give the reader an impression of current reconstruction methodologies. 
The assessment of these historical and present efforts will correlate policy guided post-
conflict reconstruction with the local US comprehensive planning model, in Chapters 4 and 5. 
The literature review sets an environment to illustrate that policy oriented reconstruction 
planning and implementation is not always conducted in the best interests of the host-nation, and 
a rational planning process, such as the ones used in local US comprehensive planning 
departments, is a possible solution to reorganizing US Army planning efforts and tying them 
with professional urban planning ethics which are focused on societies health, safety, and 
welfare. Where FM 3-07 emphasizes stability and security operations in no set method, this 
literature review seeks to provide evidence that a method and ethical influence are needed as the 
prime vehicles to secure some post-conflict region. 
 Reconstruction Operations in the Past and Present 
Post World War II Reconstruction Efforts 
Those who are familiar with reconstruction efforts of the USG know that post World War 
II
9
 (WWII) Germany and Japan remain the emblems of successful reconstruction up to this day.  
While these were not overnight successes, in time they accomplished reconstruction missions 
and objectives by eventually reintegrating each nation into the global circuit through means of 
interdependency.  Current literature attempts to compare successful measures in Germany and 
                                                 
9
 Post WWII begins in 7 MAY 1945 in Germany and 14 AUG 1945 in Japan.   
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Japan with current reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan
10
; however, WWII‟s Germany 
and Japan, as opposed to Afghanistan‟s OEF and Iraq‟s OIF, are considerably different situations 
– culturally, politically, environmentally, historically, and in the way of combative and 
peacekeeping operations.  Regardless, there are certain experiences of planning processes in 
Germany and Japan which may be carried over to functions of today‟s US Army reconstruction 
efforts; but these have to be correlated and implemented in FM 3-07 doctrine.   
In today‟s reconstruction efforts, policies are created to guide leadership decisions.  It is 
questionable as to if these policies are capable of compensating a legitimized planning process 
which develops the host-nation with the populations best interest in mind.  As we will see, 
Germany and Japan reconstruction policies are reviewed to compare the value of following a 
model to forming decisions rather than following prescribed and sometime unaffiliated USG 
policy.   
In The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan 
for Postwar Iraq, Ray Jennings, a Senior Consultant to the US Institute of Peace, reports that 
post WWII efforts were allotted sufficient assets to begin reconstruction in the two countries 
(Jennings, 2003).  Overthrown political leadership eventually became the most indispensable 
asset in securing and stabilizing each of these countries.  Ultimately, however, it was US military 
commanders who laid the groundwork and responsibility for devising a workable model in 
which to rebuild the post-conflict areas.  In Germany, General Lucius Clay, an Engineer Officer, 
                                                 
10
 Examples of literature that correlates Germany/Japan reconstruction efforts to Afghanistan/Iraq PRT 
missions are: 1) Neeson, Kieran.  (2008).  Lessons in nation-building: the American reconstruction of Germany and 
Japan.  2) Jennings, Ray S.  (2003).  The Road ahead: lessons in nation building from Japan, Germany, Afghanistan 
for post war Iraq.  3) Dobbins, James.  (2003).  America's role in nation building: from Germany to Iraq. 
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would be installed by President Roosevelt as the US Viceroy to postwar reconstruction; whereas, 
General MacArthur would command Japanese reconstruction efforts headquartered from Tokyo.   
Jennings paints an apparent dichotomy between the Germany and Japan situations based upon 
reconstruction efforts which entailed building social capital (in most ways synonymous with 
USAID‟s Partnership principle) to facilitate cooperation and coordination between occupying 
forces and the host-nations (Coyne, 2005).  Jennings shows that social capital becomes a 
reconstruction principle that is put into effect in different ways depending on the operational 
environment.  In Germany, social capital was considered an afterthought, while in Japan it was 
the foundation to reinforcing new reconstruction objectives. 
Early Germany reconstruction efforts would see General Clay appoint three German 
nationals as Regional Administrators.  These men did not have ties to the Nazi party, nor any 
criminal record (Coyne, 2005).  In the events that would unfold, they became a significant part of 
General Clay‟s administration team by operating as advisors to drafting and implementing new 
policy to reinstitute required leadership and infrastructure decisions.  It is supposed that Clay‟s 
intention were that these advisors could carry the aptitude to represent the German people‟s 
interest and advise their US superiors on German expectations and daily activities which could 
influence reconstruction efforts.   
Unfortunately, the policy to rebuild Germany went through many changes, and the initial 
guiding policy, Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) 1067
11
, created an unstable foundation for partnering 
with Germans and forming long-term impacts.  The three Germans identified as the liaisons to 
German interest would have to wait before their opinions could carry any sort of weight.  In 
                                                 
11
 As of 3JUL2010, JCS 1067 can only be accessed through the US Embassy of Germany website at: 
http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga3-450426.pdf. 
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1945, this military guidance provided the policy decision-making framework in which German 
post-conflict reconstruction (known as „post-defeat‟ in this policy) occurred.  JCS 1067 limited 
German influence in reconstruction planning and “…strongly discourage[d] fraternization with 
German officials and population”.  Bounded by this document, General Clay could only provide 
for Germans the “…minimum extent required…” for emergency repairs and shelter.  Without 
collaborating with the German population he would have limited access to know where those 
needs are or how to employ his assets to meet them.  In all certainty, JCS 1067 appeared to be a 
framework for oppression techniques, rather than policy for progressive and long-term 
reconstruction.  Part of JCS 1067s objective was to reinforce the USGs position to Germans that 
“…Germany's ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German 
economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape 
responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves.”  This policy does not formulate 
comprehensive methods toward assessment, ownership, flexibility, or social capital that favored 
the German population, nor approaches which would lead to progressive reconstruction 
planning.  Rather, it guided lackadaisical planning efforts by emphasizing a command presence 
of the occupiers.  In as much, JCS 1067 did not lay out a progressive framework for 
reconstruction as much as it did obtrusive “do‟s and don‟ts” of military leadership and activity. 
Another social capital factor that limited reconstruction progress in Germany centered on 
depriving Germans of a governing body which had their health, safety, and welfare interests 
represented.  Without professional ethical ties to reconstruction impacts, the US Army could not 
comprehensively rebuild post-conflict Germany with the best interest of the population.  The 
three Germans allowed to be part of General Clay‟s team carried no authority under JCS 1067, 
and by this policy were limited in contact with their US counterparts.  Instead, German 
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representation would be enforced through The Potsdam Agreement.  This agreement, created 
2AUG1945, was formed in Potsdam, Germany between the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic.  It was the ultimate guiding policy which laid out 
operational guidelines to redevelop Germany after is surrender.  Its main objective was to 
fragment German reconstruction into four sections, each section being governed by a different 
ally force (see Map  2-1: Division of Germany Governance 1945).  This confounded German 
interests in reconstruction by endorsing representation that is removed from societal interests and 
emplacing it with motives of international governments.  It wreaked havoc on reconstituting a 
unified Germany because independent leadership self-regulated reconstruction objectives and the 
methods required to reach them.  Therefore, while The Potsdam Agreement attempted to unify 
efforts, it unconstructively introduced various cultural backgrounds and segmented independent 
into reconstruction planning methods which could not be standardized.  In other words, JCS 
1067 did not account for neighboring functions; instead it prioritized the occupying leadership 
efforts and created an imbalance of empowerment among German leadership.   
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Map  2-2: Division of Germany Governance 1945. 
 
Source: Progress Monitoring Online (2010). 
 
In fact, much of the constraining and distorted reconstruction directives that General Clay 
received would be reciprocated across ally objectives in The Potsdam Agreement.   In the 
document it states: “…supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their 
respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States 
of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French 
Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a 
whole.”  
  29 
The details to this international reconstruction planning policy inhibited community 
approach and community discretion as part of its method.   It embraced a planning process 
through policy that primarily goes against all current reconstruction and development principles 
laid out from the USAID.  Furthermore, it provided no direction in coordinating a unity of effort 
with corresponding international and indigenous leadership.  This policy based planning model 
did not seek to empower Germans, but establish international governance authority in segmented 
regions.  It did not prove a model to embrace stability and security, but rather a division of 
control. 
JCS 1067 and The Potsdam Agreement did not offer constructive measures to insuring 
the welfare of Germans.  Both documents took for granted the contribution of Germans to 
deciding how they wanted to redefine their country under direction of USG leadership.  Instead 
of building a planning model that embraced local participation, the international community, and 
commitment, these policies focused on isolated and abstract leadership who were removed from 
neighboring efforts and from German influence.  While the policies attempted to unify Germany, 
they only did so by encouraging a bi-lateral division of democratic and socialist forms of 
government
12, and left little control of the country‟s immediate future in the hands of its own 
patriots.  As a direct result of lacking local German discretion, JCS 1067 and The Potsdam 
Agreement provided little legitimacy to US efforts.  If Germans were not allowed their 
discretion, the selection of reconstruction projects could not be prioritized to fit their need.  This 
                                                 
12
 The Potsdam Agreement would frame Germany‟s future.  Because the Soviets occupied the eastern 
portion of Germany it is believed that this reconstruction agreement lead to the formation of the Iron Curtain and the 
division of Germany by communist means.  The Potsdam Agreement can be found at Yale Law School Library: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp 
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brings to question, „would a bonafide reconstruction planning model provide superior US 
guidance to reconstruction efforts, as opposed to policy making?‟ If such a model existed, could 
it be catered to enforce health, safety, and welfare standards upon the host-nation? And, could 
such a model fin into decision making processes from the international community? 
It took two years and a change in leadership from General Clay to General George C.  
Marshal before JCS 1067 would be amended to JCS 1779.  This change in policy included 
centralizing international efforts, while primarily focusing on the German population‟s health, 
mainly through the provision of food rations and dismantling the two-class system of the 
underprivileged and privileged (Jennings, 2003).  In 1947, General Marshall renounced the 
methods of JCS 1067 under support of President Truman and replaced it with JCS 1779 
(Jennings, 2003).  However, JCS 1779 wasn‟t the solution to planning Germany‟s reconstruction 
efforts; it was more of a method to prohibit continuing the detrimental effects of JCS 1067.  It 
would be the infamous Marshall Plan which provided more liberated polices that achieved a new 
focus on constructive measures for the German people.  While this plan was largely oriented 
towards the viability of improving the European economic situation, it was largely embraced by 
the international community because it refocused USG policy to efforts which were “… directed 
not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.”13 The 
fundamentals of General Marshall‟s plan, a posteriori, embraced current principles of 
international reconstruction by endorsing reconstruction planning policies that openly included 
partnerships with European nations (Germany included), the strengthening of local institutions 
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 As of 6JUL2010, the transcript of the Marshall Plan, as given to the graduating Harvard class of 1947, 
can be found at: http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=old&doc=82&page=transcript. 
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and education facilities, long-term development impacts, and would be measured by unified 
results.   
While Germany post WWII reconstruction policies slowly evolved through the 
transitions of fragmented leadership combined with a unique subdivision into four independent 
German provinces, Japan reconstruction took an abruptly different route.  This route followed a 
more concise and planned “top down” approach.  Specifically, the reconstruction efforts of Japan 
embraced host-nation leadership, but primarily as tools for social re-organization to support 
reconstruction efforts.  All new policy, and even the new Japanese Constitution of 1947, would 
be “handed” to the Japanese government for endorsement by MacArthur‟s aides (Jennings, 
2003).  By using Japan‟s own leadership, social capital would enhance Japanese-US ties and act 
as a mechanism which reinforced new and alienated USG policies, of which the Japanese would 
be forced to embrace.  By this method, Japan‟s defeated leadership became molded into symbols 
of new direction, control, organization, collaboration, and commitments to invest in the best 
interests of the Japanese people (all actions that are characteristic of appropriate planning 
models).  USG policy did not become the mitigating control of reconstruction efforts, but rather 
part of the planning model that looked for long-term development impacts.  It looked to 
incorporate Japanese leadership to establish community identity. 
In fact, General MacArthur received counsel from General Elliot Thorpe, MacArthur‟s 
lead intelligence expert, to utilize Japan‟s highest governing body, Emperor Hirohito as a 
mechanism to achieve US objectives.  General Thorpe is recorded as explaining “[If Emperor 
Hirohito were convicted of war crimes] we would have had nothing but chaos.  The religion was 
gone, the government was gone, and he was the only symbol of control.  Now, I know he had his 
hand in the cookie jar, and he wasn‟t any innocent little child.  But he was of great use to us, and 
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that was the basis on which I recommended to the Old Man [General MacArthur] that we keep 
him” (Dower, 2000).  This single important factor played a significant role in helping post-
conflict Japanese cities to rise from utter destruction with “astounding speed” (Hein, 2003).  It 
did so by giving a familiar face to Japanese reconstruction efforts and proving that the people 
were the priority in redevelopment. 
However, this was a very controversial approach as considered by the American general 
public.  Thirty-three percent of the American public wanted Emperor Hirohito hanged, 37% 
wanted the emperor brought to justice on war crimes
14
, and only 7% saw fit for the emperor to be 
used as a “puppet under UN supervision” (Grew, 1989).   Regardless, General MacArthur, and 
ultimately President Truman, embraced Thorpe‟s recommendation.  General Thorpe‟s statement, 
would in turn, yield a framework to international reconstruction that embraced current USAID‟s 
Principles of Reconstruction and Development.  Particularly, it created a secure and functioning 
Japan by strengthening institutions through the perspective of legitimized leadership.  It 
accommodated partnership, capacity-building, and ownership.  It utilized policy to complement 
reconstruction methods.  The emperor legitimized US reconstruction efforts through promoting 
cooperation and goodwill and showed little opposition to new reforms (Jennings, 2003).  
Jennings expresses that the functions of Japanese government, by themselves, were powerless.  
They only played the roles of which General MacArthur used or consulted them for (Jennings, 
2003).  In any case, it was the realization that the host-nation must be involved with its 
redevelopment.  It was the adherence to flexible reconstruction policies, which include discretion 
of the host-nation people, which makes Japan appear to be more successful than Germany. 
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 The most heinous war-crime charge was that against the attacks on Pearl Harbor on 7DEC1941.   
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By understanding the most prevalent post WWII reconstruction policies, we should be 
able to form ideas about what methods worked well and which prohibited progress.  What comes 
to question is if there could have been an post-conflict reconstruction planning model which 
would be useful in both situations and what experiences can be taken from each country to create 
a model that would benefit other nations in similar conditions.  Certainly, any reconstruction 
efforts in a host-nation would require indigenous representation, but „what does that 
representation look like and where does it fall in the decision-making and planning process?‟  
How will organization within the US Army weigh the impacts of policy oriented planning and 
construction with method and ethical models of reconstruction? 
 
Somalia Reconstruction Efforts 
One may believe that transitioning from 1952 to 1993 would entail tremendous progress 
in stability operations and reconstruction efforts of the USG and the US Army.  Unfortunately, 
this may not be the case.  While some lessons learned might have evolved from earlier 
reconstruction efforts, by 1993 humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in Somalia would show 
that the US Army still could not learn from policy impacts it accrued during Germany and Japan 
reconstruction.  This gap in military education, experience, and lack of effort to apply previous 
lessons learned has been the source of difficult decision-making concerning the methods to 
accomplish mission objectives, and enforce the security of incapacitated regions.  As a result, 
since the mid 1990‟s, Somalia has been considered by the US and United Nations (UN) as a 
complete failure to rebuilding a functioning state and providing humanitarian assistance (White, 
2009). 
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Ever since gaining its independence from Britain and Italy in 1960, Somalia has been the 
chasm for US and UN humanitarian relief.  The main efforts of this relief were to securely 
distribute food rations to the much deprived Somalis.  But these efforts were lucratively 
prohibited by violent civil-warlords who decimated the civilian population and tore apart 
validated government authority.  The effort of the humanitarian assistance, however, was to 
sustain the host-nations welfare by providing the basic necessity of life - nourishment.  This was 
to be the first step into rebuilding the country.  Distributing food required a combination of USG 
and UN assets and unified efforts and an approachable plan.  Providing food would also be the 
first step in building social capital to enable reconstruction teams to provide much needed 
assistance and resources elsewhere in the country.  By improving social capital, the US and UN 
sought to gain the trust of the Somalia nation and assess the rebuilding efforts needed for social 
and infrastructure improvements.  But, since the scrutiny of providing food rations was taken too 
lightly, the reconstruction assignments of Somalia never had a chance to be implemented.  
Instead, the US and UN found themselves unprepared to deal with the consequences of 
underestimating the environment and impeding effects of Somali warlords. 
Between 1991 and 1992, over 300,000 Somalis would die of starvation as a result of civil 
war, an incapacitated functioning government, and lack of international effort to effectively 
organize and provide security (Jones et al., 2006).  The results of these situations lead to heavy 
criticism of US and UN efforts and the devise of OPERATION RESTORE HOPE (1992-1994).  
This operation was considered by the DOD an operation other than war (OOTW) and a “simple” 
US military task to support the UN in delivering food to Somali people (Baumann, Yates, & 
Washington, 2003).  Historically, the DOD has considered OOTW as peaceful and humanitarian 
missions; however, what turned out in this occurrence was an unexpected path of combat 
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between US Army forces and Somalia warlords which left 27 US Army soldiers dead, 1 US 
Army prisoner of war, and numerous Somalia casualties
15
.   
While reconstruction efforts were in the interest of OPERATION RESTORE HOPE 
objectives, they were not the specified task
16
; rather, they were implied, and as so distracted from 
the main effort objectives (Burlingham, 1994).  This brings into question how reconstruction 
teams operate under implied task while maintaining a unity of effort that matches specified tasks.  
Seemingly, if implied reconstruction tasks negatively impact the specified tasks, or the primary 
mission objective, then the policy or planning method has not been well thought out and may 
prove counterproductive.  In turn, any negative consequence of the reconstruction effort will be 
an unexpected blow to leadership and accomplishing its goals; thus further making it difficult to 
achieve specified tasks.   
Just as with early reconstruction efforts in post WWII Germany and the lack of specified 
reconstruction planning objectives, Somalia proved to be driven by inconspicuous policy.  This 
lack of policy and preparation plagued the Somalia missions in the following ways (Jones et al., 
2006): 
• Policymakers and aid workers did not fully appreciate the 
magnitude of the humanitarian crisis upfront. 
• From the beginning, there was no central government to 
serve as the focal point for nation-building efforts. 
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Casualties of American Wars and Military Operations are historically documented by the US Navy. 
Further study can be viewed at: http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/american%20war%20casualty.htm. 
16
 The DOD doctrine Universal Joint Task Lists explains that military operations fall under three tasks:     
1) Specified: a task explicitly stated 2) Implied: a task not stated but necessary to accomplish the mission                
3) Essential: tasks based on mission analysis and approved by the commander as absolutely necessary to accomplish 
the mission. 
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• The Somali warlords did not support the relief efforts or 
subsequent development efforts. 
• UN Operations in Somalia I17 was inadequately resourced 
to meet its broad mandate. 
• The absence of security was a major problem and, along 
with resource constraints, limited the ability of 
international relief agencies to provide humanitarian aid 
and to reach many parts of the country. 
• UN Operations in Somalia II mandate kept evolving and 
was open to a number of different interpretations by key 
participants. 
 
The focus on fluent policy, standardization, unified international efforts and preparation, 
and well thought out reconstruction planning processes would, intermittently, shift after 
President Clinton and UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali met after President Clinton‟s 
inauguration in 1993.  These world leaders created an extensive mandate for Somali nation 
building efforts between January and February 1993 (Canestrini, 2004).  However, this new 
mandate did not last long.  As the US sent home most of its military forces after a battle in 
Mogadishu which left 18 US soldiers dead and one Prisoner of War, what was left behind was a 
large presence of UN forces (25,000), a small US combatant force (1,300 soldiers), and US 
logistics and intelligence personnel (totaling 3,000) (Canestrini, 2004).  Without major US 
military occupation to provide security, the UN found itself in significant clashes with Somali 
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 UN Operations Somalia I (APR1992 - MAR1993) and Somalia II (MAR1993 - MAR1995) are 
differentiated by their objectives. Somalia I empowered the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to monitor cease-fires in 
Mogadishu, provide security for UN resources, and insure safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. Somalia II 
transitioned UNITAF authority to UN Operations Somalia II, better known as UNOSOM II, to assist the Somali 
people in developing a functioning government. An depth overview can be reviewed at: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm. 
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warlords and unable to provide security, implement reconstruction efforts, or distribute aid.  The 
clashes challenged the legitimacy and the opportunity to build social capital for the Somali 
population.  Given the situation and the toll of loss of American lives, the Clinton administration 
decided the US was not willing to accept greater risks by supplementing more resources.  
Instead, the US would completely withdrawal by 31MAR1994.  What was left behind was a 
Somalia state that “…degenerated into a basic state of civil war without any appreciable degree 
of security” (Fishel, 1997).  The nation building policy implemented in 1993, collapsed with 
astounding consequences for the Somali people. 
The reconstruction efforts in the Somalia show the calamity for relying on reactive 
decision-making processes and imprudent policy implementations.  Any attempts to reconstruct a 
fragmented society must incorporate an understanding of the cultural and physical environment 
alongside infrastructure assessments.  Somalia proves this point by implicating that 
reconstruction efforts were fruitless because of the lack of understanding the USG and UN had 
of tribal warlord power.  At the time of this study, The CIA World Factbook reports that Somalia 
is still involved in civil conflict.  There is no permanent national government, and it is rated as 
having the thirteenth highest death-rate of the world.  If US Army and international planning 
efforts centralized objectives and resources, developed and abided by a planning model rather 
than unassuming policy, would there be a different environment in which Somalis live today? 
One which is more progressive and interdependent? One which could be a testimony to the 
influence of planning and international reconstruction efforts?  Is USG policy to blame for this 
travesty? 
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Haitian Earthquake Response 
Up to this point, this study has shown how US Army reconstruction efforts have 
corresponded with post and concurrent combative conflicts.  It has attempted to show that 
relying on policy for decision-making of reconstruction efforts may not foster effective 
rebuilding methods, nor does it always maintain the best interest of the host-nation populace.  
Instead, the dependency to exclusively use policy in reconstruction efforts can cause further 
detrimental effects to the host-nation, and the region.  Reconstituting an incapacitated nation 
requires time-sensitive actions and a programmable model; and especially so when the social 
dynamics of the host-nation are interrupted by extenuating conflict.   However, not all US Army 
reconstruction missions are in response to wartime conflicts.  Many missions are solely 
concerned with humanitarian response and relief.  In fact, the DOD requested $89.2 million for 
FY 2011 to support the international community in OOTW for times of political and humanitarian 
crises18.  These efforts focus on the same principles as wartime reconstruction: increase regional 
stability and reconstitute infrastructure.  A response to utilizing resources for OOTW is the recent 
Haitian earthquake.  This example of reconstruction efforts exemplifies current leadership and 
organizational processes.  It attributes the very latest methods of reconstruction of which the US 
Army is enthroned. 
On the evening of 12JAN2010, the US Army was called to assist in a catastrophic 
earthquake in Haiti which, according to Haitian government, left 230,000 people dead.  Efforts to 
                                                 
18
 This information is taken from the Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster 
Assistance, and Civic Aid, which can be found at: 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_V
OL_1_PARTS/OHDACA_FY11.pdf 
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provide food and shelter were distributed by DOD personnel from the US Southern Command
19
 
the following day.  As part of the initial response, the USACE sent engineers to begin urban 
search and rescue operations and assess infrastructure damages.  The scope and international 
assessment of the damage was profound.  The map and images of Appendix D - Haiti 
Reconstruction Mapping Efforts attempts to illustrate the ramification of this earthquake, while 
providing a glimpse of the magnitude of reconstruction efforts
20
.  Obviously, the most devastated 
area was that of the Port-au-Prince, the highest-density area and capital of Haiti.   
Since the earthquake, immediate shock and mass hyper-critical circumstances of the 
earthquake have dissipated.  Six months later, the rebuilding processes “slowly trickle[s] in” 
(Jordan, 2010).  What the international community reconstruction efforts contend with are 
105,000 destroyed homes, 208,000 damaged homes, 1,300 schools and 50 hospitals deemed 
unusable, and almost all of public administration buildings destroyed (Interim Haiti Recovery 
Commission, 2010a).  This is a devastating impact, but even more so considering Haiti is 
comparable in size to the state of Maryland.
                                                 
19
 “The United States Southern Command, located in Miami, Florida, is one of ten unified Combatant 
Commands in the Department of Defense.  It is responsible for providing contingency planning, operations, and 
security cooperation for Central and South America, the Caribbean (except U.S. commonwealths, territories, and 
possessions), Cuba; as well as for the force protection of U.S. military resources at these locations.  SOUTHCOM is 
also responsible for ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal and canal area.” Source: http://www.southcom.mil. 
20
 While the consequences of the Haitian earthquake can be approached through many aspects, this study 
will continue to focus on physical reconstruction efforts.  It should be noted that most literature on the topic has 
focused on humanitarian relief. 
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Figure  2-1: Living conditions in Port-au-Prince, Haïti. 
 
A planning issue? Tent shelters for displaced Haitians living in the median 
of a major street in downtown Port-au-Prince.  The NY Times reports only 
28,000 of 1.5 million displaced Haitians moved into new homes. 
Source: Ruth Fremson/New York Times (2010). 
 But even by 12JUL2010, the reconstruction efforts look dismal at best.  Since 
its six month mark, reporters have flocked to Haiti to monitor and report progress of the 
earthquakes damage.  What has been found is a shocking reminder that Haitians still cannot 
acquire proper medical treatment, are starving to death, and living in unsanitary condition.  As of 
13JUL, the UN reported that 135,000 temporary shelters made of metal and wood are needed for 
the homeless and of those only 5,660 have been built (Porter, 2010).  Furthermore, as of 13JUL, 
Catherine Porter, a Canadian reporter for The Star, reported: 
 “Some 1.6 million people are still displaced, most crowded into 
impromptu camps along the sides of the road with no hope of a 
real home.  Landowners squabble over the rubble removal, many 
demanding to be compensated.  So, the roads remain clogged.” 
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The question for any rational person, who understands the value of life, is „what‟s going 
on?‟ For those in-tune with leadership principles or reconstruction efforts, a more deliberate 
question might be „who‟s in charge?‟ Or „what‟s the leadership basing their decision-making 
factors from in rebuilding Haiti?‟ These types of questions can easily lead to criticism.  But, as 
outlined in Chapter 1, the main objective of this study is getting to the root of reconstruction 
efforts – a model to provide standardization and direction.  With a displacement of 1.6 million 
people, priorities should be arranged to provide a basic staple of life – i.e. shelter; but without the 
lack of a reconstruction model this becomes a complicated and inefficient task.   
Congruently, Haitian reconstruction efforts appear to be deficient in direction 
(leadership), unity of international effort, prioritization, and Haiti is still considered in the 
“emergency stage” (Conan, 2010).  While US Army engineers are prioritizing the building of 
schools, most Haitians live in communities where “protection” is plastic sheets, sanitation is 
almost non-existence, and there is an epidemic of hygienic diseases (Van Hove, 2010).  The 
priority of Haitian reconstruction efforts have been laid out through the Interim Haiti Recovery 
Commission (IHRC), led by President Bill Clinton and Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max 
Bellerive.  This commission attempts to provide a document for unifying the reconstruction 
efforts of the international community.  It provides a vision statement that declares (Interim Haiti 
Recovery Commission, 2010b): 
We will rebuild Haiti by turning the disaster on 12 January 2010 
into an opportunity to make it an emerging country by 2030. 
 
While a vision statement is a prudent measure for morale, identity, and unifying efforts, 
this statement leaves a sense of undefined precedence.  There is little coordinating direction or 
  42 
sense of urgency to rebuild.  Vision statements, such as this one, leave organizations such as the 
US Army ignorant as to where to apply resources.  Seemingly, in this circumstance, a vision 
statement should complement the reconstruction model and instigate efforts.  Still to this day, 
there cannot be found a workable model to rebuild Haiti.  In fact, the official IHRC 
reconstruction plan, known as the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti, 
states very little in the reconstruction process, coordination, and international unity of effort 
endeavors. 
For example, the plan identifies infrastructure reconstruction necessities, but simply 
states these are dependent on the urban plan.  The IHRC reconstruction plan states (Interim Haiti 
Recovery Commission, 2010b): 
The basic infrastructure such as rainwater drainage, wastewater 
treatment, drinking water supply and the electricity network are 
directly dependent on the planned use of land.  It is therefore 
from the urban plan that the final design of the work required can 
be carried out.   
It is important to plan the necessary funds to carry out this work 
which is preliminary to or concurrent with reconstruction work. 
 
Given this doctrine to guide reconstruction efforts, there does not appear to be tasking, 
priority, or essential functions.  The plan loses detail and defers critical items, such as shelter and 
sanitation, as solely dependent on funding.  How would a reconstruction model change this? Is 
the IHRC plan operating in the best interest of the Haitian community? Could the plan 
unintentionally be causing more harm than help? Would a model provide more focus and 
direction? 
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As of 10JUN2010, a US Army Colonel is tasked with reconstruction and providing 
medical services, in a mission known as New Horizon-Haiti 2010.  In the first week of his duties 
he blogs (McCluney, 2010):  
“The fact is, we can’t wait to start building schools and providing 
medical services to the folks here in Haiti.” 
 
The Colonel ensures in other blogs that partnership with the locals is the key factor for a 
successful mission in Haiti.  While there is validity in this assessment, if the dependency on 
decision-making is clouded by that partnership, and the host-nation population suffers, then 
changes should be assessed.  In other words, if 1.5 million people are without homes and living 
in shantytown‟s that breed disease, construction of schools may not be a top priority, even if 
host-nation leadership declares so.  This brings forth the question, „who is the professional in 
reconstruction matters?‟ Is it the host-nation (who is traumatized, suffering, and incapacitated to 
the point it requires foreign assistance) or is it the occupiers (abundant in resources, trades, skills, 
education, and leadership)?  
Context of OIF/OEF Reconstruction 
Impact of Rebuilding 
US Army reconstruction teams exercise their resources through numerous command 
units.  As discussed in Chapter 1, the most well-known reconstruction teams are the PRTs.  PRTs 
have considerable funding, play an integral part in unified reconstruction efforts alongside 
international community organizations during conflicts and disasters, and operate with a 
significant workforce (generally 60+ personnel).  In Chapter 1, the perspective of the PRT was 
offered to illustrate the composition and environment of how reconstruction teams operate.  
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Much emphasis was provided of the civilian and military relationship needed to accomplish 
reconstruction efforts in the best interests of the host-nation, while focusing on OOTW.  While 
other US Army units operate in reconstruction efforts for stability operations as well, they do so 
in considerably smaller scales.  Even so, all US reconstruction teams will influence the progress 
of incapacitated nations, and therefore have a significant impact on development and security of 
decimated regions. 
Probably the most well-known and spectated post-conflict reconstruction efforts are 
currently occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan.  These nations share a violent history of civil war, 
international conflicts, civil and political conflict, inter-social clashes, and oppression.  While the 
world anticipates an end of US presences, and speculates outcomes, reconstruction teams 
continue to operate in dangerous environments for the better.  They do so as patriots, as 
constituents of peace, and as compassionate world neighbors.  The historical impact of their 
efforts may not be realized for years down the road, but their labors are the instruments which 
outline the layout of a nation‟s future.   
The assessment of OIF and OEF reconstruction planning efforts will help better speculate 
the impact of development in the Mid-East, while testing the reconstruction team‟s capabilities.  
Just as the social (insurgent) leaderships have not withstood the powers of the US and UN, the 
infrastructure in Iraq and Afghanistan has suffered from the calamities of war.  Therefore, these 
considerations are of special interests to reconstruction efforts.  As infrastructure is rebuilt, it will 
inevitably alter each countries future; it is, after all, the infrastructure which lays the foundation 
to a nation‟s capacity to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. 
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Afghanistan 
The onset of 11SEP2001 has lead US and UN military forces into the core of 
Afghanistan, readied and willing to disperse an oppressive governmental regime which has deep 
ties to the culprit Al-Qaeda network, responsible for attacks on the US.  In 2002 multi-national 
forces expunged the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and brought an entourage of support 
personnel prepared to “put back together” a dismantled political environment and repair decades 
of neglected social and physical infrastructure.  The efforts of these reconstruction teams 
continue today, and their presence has expounded multifold in order to meet the demands of key 
USG, UN, and Afghan leaders.   
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the first US reconstruction team came to Gardez, Afghanistan 
in 2002 (Map 2-2); but before its deployment, came multifaceted directions on conditions of how 
these teams would operate.  In an explosive manner, direction poured in from USG agencies into 
how and who would play a role in Afghanistan redevelopment.  One of the earliest known 
reconstruction organization meetings was formed on 20NOV2001, as a co-hosted function 
between the DOS and Japan‟s Afghan Assistance Program.  This meeting, known simply as 
Reconstruction of Afghanistan, put into perspective the grandeur challenges of overthrowing the 
Taliban, reconstituting a democratic-type government, and “rebuilding” Afghanistan (US Dept. 
of State, 2001).  But what did the Afghanistan landscape look like during the Taliban control? 
What were the livelihoods and liberties of Afghan civilians and how well was the infrastructure 
intact? 
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Map 2-2: Gardez, Afghanistan, the first reconstruction team in Afghanistan since 2001. 
Source: GoogleEarth (2010). 
 Understanding the historical context gives US Army reconstruction teams a „situational 
awareness‟ of the civilian and cultural situation on behalf of whom teams are exercising 
development efforts.  It provides insight into societal capabilities and presents an assessment 
which may prioritize social or infrastructure needs.  In comparison, US Army reconstruction 
teams would not anticipate creating nuclear reactor power plants to supply the electrical 
infrastructure in an incapacitated country such as Afghanistan, without first assessing the proper 
indigenous resources (technology, education, skill, experience, learning capacity, materials).  
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Instead, US Army reconstruction teams would approach these types of efforts through 
understanding the recent historic context of the nation involved.  The team would hypothesize 
the building capacity of the nation, and match development efforts based on assessments.  In 
other words, in ideal circumstances, the teams would create an evaluation of the nation‟s 
qualifications and potential; which, in turn, helps to develop appropriate agenda items relative to 
capability.  Thus, in the case of Afghanistan, instead of a nuclear reactor power plant, possibly a 
hydro power plant is more suitable to distribute new or repaired power infrastructure. 
In any case, for many, the first thought of the Taliban controlled Afghanistan era (1996-
2001) brings mental images of a dismal and oppressive regime attacking the social and physical 
infrastructure of an already suffering population.  During the past few recent decades, 
international and civil conflict, coupled with Taliban control, have created stifling effects by 
expunging personal developmental paths which embrace modernity in Afghanistan.  This has left 
the country without “… a critical mass of workers, middle-class intellectuals and professionals, 
or even a modern bourgeoisie” (Moghadam, 1999).  Through understanding this environment 
and the workforce composition of Afghanistan‟s general population, areas of interests are created 
which prompt needs for addressing by reconstruction teams.  If Afghanistan lacks a middle-class, 
then it is comprised of an incapable and technologically decanted population.  This may indicate 
to US Army reconstruction team‟s areas in which to address literacy and vocational 
infrastructure needed to improve adulthood aptitudes for obtaining, and maintaining, demanded 
and long-lasting technical skill-sets.  This method, in turn, becomes a tool which supports 
reconstruction efforts by initiating the means towards an industrious environment.  It centralizes 
a focus on the construction of instructional infrastructure facilities, as a part of an economic 
developmental plan.  By establishing the ground roots of a middle-class, the population can look 
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towards paths of trade and industrial progress.  This is significant because a country without a 
middle-class loses its viability, stability, and growth (Aho, 2009).  Therefore, if a country has no 
middle-class, then the fundamental resources for maintaining stability are lost, and civilians may 
find themselves subjected to undesirable domineering factions.   
Another aspect of Taliban controlled Afghanistan, is the colossal abuse of women and 
girls human rights.  For example, on 09AUG2010 Taliban commander Mohammad Yousuf was 
responsible for lashing a pregnant widowed woman 200 times before shooting her in the head 
three times for charges of adultery (Mati, 2010).  According to the National Organization for 
Women Foundation (NOW) during the Taliban regime women‟s human rights were oppressed in 
the following ways (National Organization for Women Foundation, 2007): 
 Women and girls are forbidden to go to school or work 
outside of the home.   
 Women and girls may not leave their homes without a male 
relative.   
 Women are forced to wear a head-to-toe covering called a 
"burqa" with only a small mesh opening through which to 
breathe and see.   
 Women have been beaten and killed for not being properly 
covered or escorted.   
 The windows of homes occupied by women must be painted 
to prevent women from being seen.   
 Health care for Afghan women and girls is virtually non-
existent since male doctors may not care for female patients.   
 Women are forbidden from speaking in public.   
 Pubescent girls and women are prohibited from speaking to 
males who are not close relatives. 
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Since the Taliban era, these oppressive measures have slowly subdued.  As recently as the 
20AUG2009 Afghanistan Presidential elections, two women ran for presidency, five ran for vice 
presidency, and around 300 ran for provincial council membership (Burton & Erickson, 2009).  
Even so, the results of these efforts are less than celebratory.  All women face severe tyranny of 
basic human rights.  Current Afghan women in parliament are divided, inexperienced, and lack 
the common amount of respect shared among men parliamentary members (Schweikardt, 2010).   
This lack of women parliamentary power has been globally illustrated on MAR2009, when 
Afghan President Hamid Karzi instituted Muslim Shiite Personal Status Law.  This law, among 
other things, allows women to be denied food and water if they do not sexually perform for their 
husbands and prohibits women from leaving their homes unless given explicit permission from 
their husbands (Wahdat, 2010).  While President Karzi‟s Shiite Personal Status Law is a process 
of the legitimatized Afghan governance, it continues to give US Army reconstruction team‟s 
context into social, civil, and human rights issues.   
Much more can be expressed about the damaging and harmful effects of the Taliban and 
how it continues to influence culture, but this section of Chapter 2 has only provided a glimpse 
into the oppressiveness measures and effects the Taliban has forced on the Afghan population.  
Among other Taliban regime characteristics were the outlaw of television, imprisonment of men 
who kept beards to short, destruction and intolerance of religions not Islamic (i.e. the organized 
destruction of the giant Buddha statues in Bamiyan), the exploitation of farmers to harvest and 
produce opium, and the establishment and brutal enforcement of an unsupported Islamic 
judiciary system (Bruno & Kaplan, 2009).  The importance of this historic environment may 
foster a complex relationship between reconstruction and encouraging human rights.  These 
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events do not suppose that US Army reconstruction teams can create measures to solve human 
rights issues, but it does suggest areas of concentration where teams can focus efforts. 
US Army reconstruction team professionals in Afghanistan, as well as across the globe, 
must analyze the definition of „dwelling‟ as it relates to specific areas.  What does dwelling mean 
and how does it apply to the composition of the population? What does dwelling mean to an 
Afghan adult versus a child? A woman versus a man? The elderly versus Afghan children? Sunni 
versus Shiite? Islamist versus other religions versus secularism? Where the NOW organization 
focuses‟ on social projects for the sole benefit of women‟s human rights, US reconstruction 
teams can implement social and physical infrastructure development to instill human rights for 
all, with focus for women, children and the elderly.  They can address these questions, and 
should do so for lasting effects of development for which the Afghan culture can embrace and 
understand.  These teams should understand how the community emphasizes appropriate 
dwellings; and foster insight into the importance of acting decisively and cognately in respects to 
historic and present cultural, social, and physical dwelling environment when implementing 
reconstruction efforts.  For example, in areas where women‟s rights are scant, reconstruction 
teams can offer public services, such as healthcare, secure community buildings and public 
spaces, and vocational training institutes, within a community to primarily focus on women‟s 
needs in order to instigate better quality of life agendas.   
But what is happening in Afghanistan reconstruction efforts and how is the US Army 
utilizing FM 3-07 and Government Policy? The first half of the question is as complex as the 
second half.  US Army reconstruction efforts continue to embrace a streamline of criticism.  As 
demonstrated in Chapter 1 the HASC has reported the reconstruction discrepancies pertaining 
deficiencies in guidance, leadership, and objectives.  The analysis and disapproval by HASC of 
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current reconstruction teams operations in Afghanistan, and Iraq appears to undermine change.  
The point should be emphasized that the implementation of reconstruction teams continues to 
mystify the leadership which put them into effect.  But are the effects of US Army reconstruction 
teams really as unconstructive as criticism suggest? 
Afghanistan has seen numerous entitlements of US and UN efforts to re-establish the 
legitimacy of the Afghan government while ousting Taliban control.  Whether these entitlements 
are the solitary results of US Army reconstruction teams is unlikely; however, their part as a 
whole of government approach plays a vital role into the development of the region.  Regardless, 
it‟s worth listing some improvements in Afghanistan in order to gain a measure of reconstruction 
effects.  It‟s even more valuable if one considers the historic context as mentioned above, and 
uses it as a baseline to correlate the quality of life from Afghanistan past to Afghanistan present. 
As of DEC2009, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reported 
a$51 billion US contribution for Afghan relief and reconstruction (Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2010).  Figure  2-2: US Afghanistan Reconstruction Assistance 
Funding illustrates the breakdown of how this money was distributed.  Notice that contributing 
to Security develops to be the primary intent.  This graph appears to support the USs monetary 
investment into creating stability in the region by investing in security measures.  It can be 
concluded that this investment has been distributed to empower the capability of the Afghan 
National Army and the Afghan National Police. 
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Figure  2-2: US Afghanistan Reconstruction Assistance Funding. 
 
Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/jan2010/pdf/SIGAR_Jan2010.pdf (2010). 
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 While the distribution of funding show‟s area of concentration for US reconstruction 
teams, they literal breakdown provides context into what efforts are being emplaced.  USAID has 
reported improvements of Afghanistan reconstruction efforts in a constructive manner; just a few 
of these developments are as follows (USAID, 2010d): 
 Afghanistan elected its first democratic government [in 30 
years] in 2004. 
 Afghanistan government has established Provincial and 
District levels of authority. 
 US reconstruction teams have implemented more than 1,900 
community stabilization activities. 
 Eighty percent of the “Ring Road” has been developed and 
reconstructed21. 
 17,000 Afghans are employed by USAID for infrastructure 
projects. 
 Reconstruction teams continue to improve the distribution of 
electrical power through the construction of power 
transmission lines. 
 Reconstruction teams have rehabilitated two turbines at the 
Kajaki hydropower facility which has doubled its capacity 
compared to recent times. 
 The construction of the Tarakhil Power Plant now provides 
electricity to more than 600,000 Afghan resident of the city of 
Kabul. 
 Afghanistan has its first commercialized utility company, Da 
Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat, in recent times. 
 Healthcare is now provided to more than 625,000 women and 
children on a monthly basis, who had no health care option in 
the past. 
                                                 
21
 A map of Afghanistan‟s “Ring Road” is illustrated as Appendix D. 
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 Special skill sets are now offered to women. 
 Reconstruction teams have provided more than 54,000 
women with USAID community based education. 
 A women’s dormitory has been created at Kabul University to 
house 1,000 females. 
 Seventy-eight women have been officially trained as judges 
and 670 females have been trained as journalist. 
 
In conjunction with these developments reconstruction teams continue to rebuild the 
Afghanistan defense infrastructure, mainly by employing a capable workforce.  In particular is 
the Afghan National Army, who has reached its aim of 134,000 members two months ahead of 
its OCT2010 goal (Raddatz, 2010).  This national fighting force requires a plethora of logistical 
requirements, which include housing/dining facilities, medical facilities, and access to 
water/wastewater infrastructure, to name just a few.  In fact, the USACE has conducted business 
conferences for Afghan contractors to bid work for these types of logistical requirements, and 
other reconstruction projects (Giblin, 2010).  This portrays the cyclical effects that projects have 
on the Afghan community in regards to exchanges of goods and services for money.   
These reconstruction team developments can be correlated to „cause and effect‟ 
relationships.  For example, one „cause‟ of the Taliban regime has created a sever lack of 
healthcare provision of certain Afghan populations (mainly women); in „effect‟, reconstruction 
teams can deploy necessary immediate medical professionals to provide assistance, while 
forecasting long term needs for healthcare infrastructure. 
This point can be shown through Afghan reconstruction team as operations that embraced 
historic events to play an integral part in how planning measures are approached for 
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redevelopment.  The historic and cultural composition of a nation provides insight into 
opportunity in prioritizing needed construction for social matters, as well as basic quality of life 
improvements.  However, what lacks from current US Army reconstruction teams is an 
assessment process that monitors post development.  This plays a significant role because US 
Army reconstruction teams are assembled to promote security and stability and their 
effectiveness is not documented.   
In depth looks in post developments may reveal a significant conundrum.  The 
infrastructure and facilities put in place by US Army reconstruction teams may actually be 
conducive to some forms violence.  For instance, the USG‟s unruly support of rebuilding and 
creating educational infrastructure may have produced pockets of known targets of which 
insurgents‟ assault.  If US Army reconstruction teams do not account for their vacancy as part of 
their international planning process, then horrific consequences, such as the targeting of girls 
schools, are brought upon the population who is left to support the facility.   
To illustrate, in recent times Taliban insurgents have made great efforts to attack 
education facilities of children, and especially so for girl schools.  Nick Meo, from the United 
Kingdom‟s The Times, reports that Taliban have returned to target schools in a deadly manner 
(Meo, 2008).  Mr. Meo explains, “The security situation is now so bad in Kandahar province that 
nearly half of all schools are closed some or all of the time.  Girls' classes have been particularly 
badly hit…” He continues by reporting of the 2006 girl‟s school bombing in which the Taliban 
claimed 16 young innocent lives; and after an interview with an Afghan teacher, an illustration of 
the fear of “…explosions, kidnappings, and assassinations…” is shown as daily concerns of 
children and adults. 
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While the claim of young innocent lives is heart-wrenching, they are not the only victims 
of unsecured reconstruction development progress.  Consistently, Afghan road crews are targeted 
as supporters of the Afghan Government and Coalition Forces, a deed strictly prohibited by 
Taliban insurgency; in one attack as recently as 19AUG2010, as many as 30 Afghans were killed 
and others abducted (Shoaib, 2010).  In similar instances, road workers are targeted through 
attacks and kidnappings.  On 08APR2008 the Taliban killed 17 road workers and of JAN of the 
same year beheaded four workers in eastern Nuristan Province (The New York Times, 2008) and 
on 27OCT2008 the Agence France-Presse reported fourteen road crew workers were abducted 
by suspected Taliban groups (Agence France-Presse, 2008). 
In conclusion of Afghan reconstruction, on 10AUG2010 the UN Assistance Missions in 
Afghanistan held a press conference which released data that 76% of Afghan casualties are a 
result from anti-government elements (de Mistura & Gagnon, 2010).  To US Army 
reconstruction teams, the major anti-government element is the offending Taliban; who have 
created an environment of “oppressive” security in which human rights are suppressed in order 
to maintain order.  The challenge for reconstruction teams is to abide by their leadership 
directives and create new and sustainable environments in which comprehensive security is 
enforced by legitimate local authority.  The question then becomes, “If given these circumstance, 
are we making progress in Afghanistan?” Conceptualizing progress in Afghanistan is 
circumstantial.  Reconstruction efforts show progress in areas, but criticism continues to 
illustrate a dismal future for Afghanistan and the US. 
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Iraq 
 
“I have no idea what CENTCOM was planning, and I have absolutely no idea what the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff were planning.  I do know that the political guidance they were getting from 
Rumsfeld, the NSC, and the White House was, „You got about three months to get [the postwar 
Iraqi government] up and running.‟” 
-General Colin Powell, Secretary of State (2001-2005) 
 
While the exact reasons for the proliferation of OIF remains questionable for some, US 
interests to rebuild the fallen Iraqi regime were rooted in early USG policy soon after 
11SEP2001.  The above quote from General Collin Powell sets the tone for the reconstruction, 
stabilizing, and security tempo of which the DOD would be forced to accommodate following 
the invasion of Iraq on 19MAR2003.  In much of the same manner that criticism shows of 
current reconstruction efforts, there appeared to be an ad hoc in the initial organization and 
tasking of how Iraq would be rebuilt after its regime was conquered.  However, unlike 
Afghanistan, US Army reconstruction teams in Iraq had a different social and physical 
environment to encounter for efforts there. 
Where Afghanistan was ruled by an outlawed regime, Iraq entailed a “functioning” 
government which was responsible for recorded events of genocide.  In similarities with 
Afghanistan, Iraqis have seen a violent history within past decades which has influenced its 
present culture.  Recent history shows Iraq has been involved in clashes with Kurdish and Shia 
factions, and the countries of Israel, Kuwait, Iran, Britain and the US (British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2010).  This gives US Army reconstruction teams a perspective which emphasizes 
the sensitivity of transitioning from a history of violence to one of peace and security.  However, 
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while these clashes were the focus of abhorrent leadership, nothing compares to the mass 
genocide conducted by the Iraqi government onto the Kurds during the 1980s. 
In 1988, after years of torture and murder, an estimated 200,000 Kurds were killed in a 
single year through the use of poisonous gas (US Marine Corps, 2003) on behalf of a religious 
enforcement as documented in the 8
th
 chapter of the Quran, known as Anfal (Human Rights 
Watch, 1993).  The directions of these attacks were orchestrated by Saddam Hussein and were 
not the only acts against humanity with which he has been charged.  The Human Rights Watch 
organization lists major violations of human rights, as follows (Human Rights Watch, 1993): 
 Mass summary executions and mass disappearance of many 
tens of thousands of non-combatants, including large numbers 
of women and children, and sometimes the entire population 
of villages. 
 The widespread use of chemical weapons, including mustard 
gas and the nerve agent GB, or Sarin, against the town of 
Halabja as well as dozens of Kurdish villages, killing many 
thousands of people, mainly women and children. 
 The wholesale destruction of some 2,000 villages, which are 
described in government documents as having been 'burned,' 
'destroyed,' 'demolished' and 'purified,' as well as at least a 
dozen larger towns and administrative centers.   
 The wholesale destruction of civilian objects by Army 
engineers, including all schools, mosques, wells and other 
non-residential structures in the targeted villages, and a 
number of electricity substations. 
 Arbitrary arrest of all villagers captured in designated 
'prohibited areas', despite the fact that these were their own 
homes and lands 
 Arbitrary jailing and warehousing for months, in conditions of 
extreme deprivation, of tens of thousands of women, children 
and elderly people, without judicial order or any cause other 
than their presumed sympathies for the Kurdish opposition. 
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 Many hundreds of them were allowed to die of malnutrition 
and disease. 
   
Supplementary, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office of UK reported the following 
social and oppressive environmental conditions for Iraqis (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 
London, 2002):  
 Saddam has, through the Revolutionary Command Council, 
issued a series of decrees establishing severe penalties 
(amputation, branding, cutting off of ears, or other forms of 
mutilation) for criminal offences. 
 There is first-hand evidence that the Iraqi regime tortures 
children. 
 A 1990 decree allows male relatives to kill a female relative in 
the name of honor without any punishment. 
 According to Amnesty International, in October 2000, dozens 
of women accused of prostitution were beheaded without any 
judicial process, together with men accused of pimping. 
 Executions are carried out without due process of law. 
 Shia community leaders are killed when their presence 
become too imminent. 
 
While this is not an inclusive list of human rights violations, it sets the tone for what US 
Army reconstruction teams may encounter culturally when conducting operations to entice 
security in the region.  Given the recent past of Iraq, it is likely that fear and distrust of large 
organizations (which include the US Army and efforts of empowering a new Iraqi government) 
have been conceived by certain Iraqi populations.  This happens because fear can be developed 
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through a reaction to some circumstance (Miller, 2007).  Where an organized institution 
mutilates, tortures, rapes, embezzles, and murders innocent lives because of ethnicity (Human 
Rights Watch, 1993), feelings of despair, distrust, and anger may evolve against new 
organizations who emerge and set out to remedy those actions.  By recognizing potential fears 
host-nation communities might have developed, US Army reconstruction teams can begin to 
reconstitute broken infrastructure in a manner that is perceptive and insightful of community 
needs.   
Furthermore, understanding cultural context allows US Army reconstruction teams to 
recognize potential and fundamental communication barriers.  During reconstruction efforts, 
intertwining cultures, such as the occupiers and the host-nation, are unfamiliar with each other‟s 
cultural and social behavioral skills (Ward, Bochner, & Furnham, 2003).  The onset of this 
unfamiliarity can create a cycle of “…misunderstanding, friction, and hostility” (Ward et al., 
2003).  These teams must be sensitive to preserving cultural heritage and conducting 
reconstruction projects where human rights are not violated.  Positive cultural heritage has the 
power to promote hope and optimism and entice creativity (Kreimer, Eriksson, Muscat, Arnold, 
& Scott, 1998), which could be very favorable attributes during a time of post-conflict 
reconstruction.  Instigating measures where reconstruction does not benefit the health, safety, 
and welfare of the entire population may come across as signs of favoritism and distrust, and 
prolong sustainable efforts. 
While the host-nation cultural perspective of any reconstruction process is worth 
evaluating for the reasons mentioned above, assessments of physical infrastructure in post-
conflict lays the foundation of where resources can immediately be applied, granted the correct 
security measures are provided.  When the country assessment was completed by Bechtel 
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Corporation, following the initial invasion in 2003, reconstruction assessment teams found 
themselves in the midst of a monumental task.  In the 2003 Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction 
Program Assessment Report, Bechtel comprehensively assessed selective infrastructure of 
seaports, airports, water and wastewater facilities, irrigation, power, roads, railroads, bridges, and 
buildings.  This 151 page document provides explicit information which describes the 
discrepancies of infrastructure networks.  The layout of each infrastructure entity was divided 
into chapters which provided: 1) Existing Conditions 2) Requirements for Restoration of Critical 
Services 3) Needs Assessment 4) Challenges 5) Existing Operation & Maintenance Organization 
6) Recommendations.  Each infrastructure entity, such as buildings, was geo-tagged with photos 
and added to a database to be referenced for reconstruction efforts at a later time.  Examples of 
common discrepancies can be found in the figures of Appendix F – Physical Infrastructure 
Discrepancies in Iraq. 
The drawing conclusion of the Iraq infrastructure assessment which Bechtel expressed 
explained the difficulties in rebuilding this country; “The Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction 
Program faces unprecedented programwide challenges” (Bechtel Corporation, 2003).  In this 
assessment report, power distribution, major transportation networks, and water/wastewater 
facilities are expressed as needing immediate attention.  Table  2-1: Bechtel Synopsis of Iraq 
Infrastructure Assessment 2003 provides a synopsis of Bechtel‟s findings.  While this table 
does not list all physical infrastructure repairs needed, it emphasizes areas needed for 
reconstruction teams to start reconstituting a functioning modern society
22
; mainly power 
distribution, transportation, and water/wastewater treatment.
                                                 
22
 In his book “Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being and WHY NO 
ONE SAW IT COMING”, Paul Hawken explains that a modern society is one in which people “…move along 
  62 
                                                                                                                                                             
streets…move freight by rail, ships, and airfields… [are] powered by electricity… must be kept clean by water and 
wastewater facilities as well as garbage disposal… and [communicate] through landlines, cell phones, and the postal 
service.” He further states that “The sum total of all these working parts and the system itself is called 
“infrastructure”.  Infrastructure is considered by many to be the most important driving force in community 
economic development… In developing nations, roads, electricity, and water and wastewater infrastructures are the 
highest priorities” (page 284). 
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 Table ‎2-1: Bechtel Synopsis of Iraq Infrastructure Assessment 2003. 
Infrastructure Assessed Brief of needed rehabilitation 
1 Seaport 
In need of 3-4 million cubic meters of material removed to 
make way for large vessels.  Also in need of removal of 
wrecks and sunken objects. 
2 Airports (International Gateways) 
Completely inoperative air-ground/ground-ground 
communication systems.  Also in need of comprehensive 
rehabilitation of airport infrastructure requirements; such as 
passenger terminal, fuel depot, power, and 
water/wastewater. 
Power Substations 
75% of major power substations are destroyed, mainly 
through extensive looting. 
21 Generating Units 
The total normal capacity of all generating units’ equals 
8,660MW, as of the assessment the total approximate 
output equaled 3, 545MW.  Existing units are unreliable and 
posed to frequent breakdown. 
Transmission Lines Are mostly damaged post-conflict through looting. 
21 Water Facilities 
Generally, water facilities are not effectively functioning due 
to large amounts of entering wastewater. 
7 Sewage Treatment Plants 
Most wastewater treat plants bypass waste treatment and 
deposit directly into a river. 
1 Sludge Treatment Plant Inoperable. 
11 Pump Stations 
Many pumps are operating beyond the usefulness of their 
intended life. 
89 Potable Water Pump Stations No potable pump station is operating to full capacity. 
Road and Railway Network 
The entire road/railway system network has deteriorated 
due to conflict, neglect, low quality construction methods 
and materials, and incompletion of projects 
49 Bridges 
Thirty-three were assessed, with 30 requiring immediate 
attention, and three being completely destroyed. 
5,425 Structures 
Of the schools, medical facilities, and public service 
(police & fireman) buildings, 1,345 needed immediate 
rehabilitation. 
Source: Author (2010). 
Interestingly, the largest culprit which crippled and weakened infrastructure did not occur 
during the US led invasion in 2003, but instead was a result of looting which occurred afterward 
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(Bensahel et al., 2008).  Without a functioning government and amidst combat operations, 
security of infrastructure was non-complacent, thereby allowing the people opportunity to exploit 
and amass perceived valuable commodities, such as the metal attained from transmission lines, 
valuables and artifacts from public buildings, and components from machinery, to be sold as 
merchandise.  The tribulation with looting could possibly play a significant role into efforts of 
reconstruction if it were taken into account as an ordeal which impedes efforts.  In other words, 
if components to key infrastructure equipment were intact, then one may conceive there may 
require less time, money, and effort to repair existing components, rather than the difficult 
logistical process of identifying, acquiring, transporting, and installing new components.  
Congruently, when asked about looting in Iraq weeks after the liberation, Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged that these things are “part of the price” of war and are part of 
Iraqis “pent up feelings” concerning the years of oppression (Loughlin, 2003).  Even so, as part 
of stabilizing an incapacitated nation, paths of least resistance in infrastructure rebuilding could 
allow for more fluid efforts.   
While the issues of looting remained a tremendous difficulty for reconstruction teams, 
Bechtel suggested that the greatest challenges lie in security measures and access to facilities for 
reconstruction teams and contractors; where protection for teams is a primary concern and 
protection against looting would help prevent substantial additional costs.  Among other 
challenges are the integration of the whole of government approach along with international 
players; these conditions create difficult challenges in communication, cultural exchange and 
organizational characteristics (Bechtel Corporation, 2003).  It is perceived that if co-existing 
governments cannot work with each other, that the fundamental international development 
principle Partnership is unattainable.  If one of the fundamental principles is lost, than 
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reconstruction efforts could become increasingly difficult.  In short, there are many concerns US 
Army reconstruction teams had, and should have, considered as initial stability operations began 
in Iraq.  But since that time, what has been achieved? What are some progressive milestones that 
have been met, and are these being sustained? 
Recent assessments conducted by USAID
23
 and the USACE
24
 show how reconstruction 
teams have pieced together post-conflict Iraq.  While it is beyond the scope of this work to 
provide a comprehensive list of achievements, the following items provide a testimony that 
changes have been made.  It should be understood that organizing these achievements has been a 
daunting task.  In line with the ad hoc nature of organizing reconstruction teams, there has not 
been found a comprehensive study into the assessment of individual  reconstruction team efforts; 
instead, what exists are discombobulated reports to congress, inter-agency reports, and 
independent studies of mostly generalized improvements.  Regardless, the reconstruction items 
listed here are provided for context: 
 The first ever introduction of Kurds into Iraq political system 
occurred in 2003. 
 Increasing power availability to more than 7 million people. 
 First time in 40 years that International Oil companies have 
returned to Iraq. 
 Rehabilitation of 2,962 schools. 
                                                 
23
 Information obtained from USAID was found by thoroughly investigating the USAID Assistance for 
Iraq, found at: http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/.  Accessed SEP2010. 
24
 Information obtained from USACE was found by investigating the USACE Gulf Region District 
Cumulative Reconstruction Fact Sheet, found at:  
http://www.grd.usace.army.mil/news/factsheets/docs/June_2010.pdf.  Accessed SEP2010. 
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 Provided skills training to more than 3,200 primary health care 
professionals. 
 Constructed six new primary health care facilities. 
 Established five mobile medical units, capable of servicing 
25,000 people. 
 Completed 313 village road projects and expressways. 
 Rehabilitated waster facilities to accommodate an extra 2.3 
million Iraqis and rehabilitated wastewater facilities to 
accommodate over 5.1 million Iraqis. 
 Repaired power distribution to accommodate 8.5 million 
people with dependable and consistent service. 
 Absolute complete renovation of two international gateway 
airports, to include construction of security checkpoints and 
luggage x-ray units. 
 Absolute reconstruction of Iraq’s seaport to allow for larger 
vessels, total renovation of grain-receiving facility, and an 
establishment of port tariffs for seagoing operations.   
 Completed 72km of railway between seaport and closest 
urban area, and 112 railroad renovations across the country. 
 Reconstructed three key bridges necessary for transportation, 
and assessed, repaired, or demolished 36 subsequent bridges. 
 Initiated a 1,200km national fiber optic network as the 
backbone of communications. 
 Nearly 60% of USAIDs small business grants have been 
awarded to women. 
 Assisted to get 68 women elected in Iraq’s new National 
Assembly. 
 
Juxtaposed to Afghanistan, Iraq reconstruction efforts must also contend with attacks, in 
addition to looting, on physical infrastructure (Clancy, Dion, Hardy, & Jackson, 2007).  To give 
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context to the importance of security operations during reconstruction, the US taxpayers have 
contributed a total of $53 billion into Iraq reconstruction efforts from 2003 to 2009 (Tarnoff, 
2009), of which $20.4 billion was spent on security measures alone (M. Kelly, 2010).  Figure 
 2-3: US Iraq Reconstruction Assistance Funding provides a breakdown of how money was 
distributed in support of reconstruction efforts.  The highest appropriations of funds are 
distributed to Security – Equipment and Training.  This investment was created to enhance the 
Rule of Law as set by the new Iraqi Government.  The next highest appropriations fell into the 
category of Infrastructure - Electricity.  $4.86 billion has been spent in rehabilitation and 
construction of power infrastructure. 
Investments such as this help ensure that efforts of partnership and governance are 
legitimatized in the perception of the local populace.  If the local populace perceives that their 
government, alongside occupying forces, cannot instill and maintain basic infrastructure 
elements, then authority and control maybe be further challenged by the onset of illegitimate 
factions. 
In conclusion, “Are we making progress in Iraq?” is difficult to answer.  US 
reconstruction teams continue to impact the health, safety, and welfare of Iraqis; but the 
perception of US capabilities and the magnitude of the issue continue to fuel criticism.  As with 
the reconstruction of Germany and Japan, perhaps years down the road we will have a better 
understanding of our reconstruction implications. 
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Figure  2-3: US Iraq Reconstruction Assistance Funding. 
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CHAPTER 3 - Methodology 
“There is a quality even meaner than outright ugliness or disorder, and this meaner 
quality is the dishonest mask of pretended order, achieved by ignoring or suppressing the real 
order that is struggling to exist and to be served.” 
 -Jane Jacobs 
 
Introduction 
Up unto this point, there should be a good understanding of the complexity of the 
reconstruction team composition, examples of historical and present efforts, and the occupational 
environment that dictates their actions and control.  Reconstruction teams are comprised of 
multi-government organizations as dictated by a whole of government approach.  In this manner, 
the huge availability of resources from the US Army makes them a prime candidate for playing a 
significant part in these efforts.  Reconstruction teams are responsible to reconstitute, in a 
positive manner, the effects of a fragmented society after some post-conflict event.  Their actions 
are primarily dictated by USG policy and developmental principles as laid out by FM 3-07; but 
evolve around social issues, cultural issues, human rights issues, the physical and social 
conditions of post-conflict environments, and the ability to set into place actions which promote 
a self-ruling government.   
The host of criticism that challenges the reconstruction team‟s effectiveness mainly 
proclaims a lack of organizational effort and defined objectives.  The concept of organizing and 
defining objectives is a difficult concept for these teams, given that the reconstruction planning 
process is based on policy.  When policy is politically motivated it may be inconsistent, flawed, 
  70 
and biased; thereby foregoing the basic needs of a society (such as current US Army‟s efforts to 
rebuild schools in Haiti, as 1.5 million Haitians struggle through life in shantytowns).  Therefore, 
the reason for writing this thesis is to explore the validation of these criticisms and provide a 
proposed model to the US Army‟s approach to reconstruction. 
The intent of the literature review was to provide a synopsis of reconstruction efforts in 
the past and present, to understand their effect on human rights and the development of social 
and physical infrastructure, to become familiar with the operational environment of post-conflict 
reconstruction agendas, and to justify if criticism to these efforts ascertains truth.  Effort was 
applied to illustrate how policy and political decision making (such as JCS 1067 reconstruction 
policy of WWII, the Presidential directive to abandon Somalia before reconstruction efforts 
could begin, and the US Army‟s efforts to reconstruct schools before improving dilapidated 
living conditions in Haiti) may create negative consequences upon host-nation reconstruction 
when it does not adhere to sustaining ethical values, such as the enforcement of health, safety, 
and welfare of the population.   
Research Design and Validation 
Determining that policy may implement different results than an post-conflict 
development model relies on theoretical and empirical evidence.  Since international 
development models are not used in the US Army, it is impossible to accurately address their 
potential effects.  Therefore, in order to validate a proposed post-conflict development model for 
US Army reconstruction teams, this thesis implements a non-experimental design research 
approach.  As demonstrated in the literature review, validation occurs in the analysis and 
correlational study between policy and post-conflict construction to suggest that policy driven 
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reconstruction efforts are not always applied in the best interest of the host-nation.  While policy 
is the only method which drives the reconstruction planning process of US Army reconstruction 
teams, there are no methods to alter this variable.  Also, since the occupational environment 
entails innumerous variables, both social and physical, it is not feasible to hypothesize that a 
proposed post-conflict development model will replicate specific expected results.  Instead, the 
non-experimental research design validates this thesis by enforcing four conceptual ideas: 1) 
Policy oriented planning processes are not the only method for US Army reconstruction teams to 
instigate in reconstruction efforts for a post-conflict society; 2) Juxtaposed to the US Army‟s 
Military Decision Making Process
25
 (MDMP), local US planning models follow a similar 
rational path of problem solving; therefore, interconnecting familiar concepts to draw 
conclusions in reconstruction is a logical approach; 3) Correlational  evidence of policy oriented 
reconstruction processes versus international development models, for US Army efforts of 
reconstruction in post-conflict societies, cannot be effectively and accurately fabricated in 
quantitative measurements; and 4) Phenomenological  approaches to post-conflict reconstruction 
models are valid elements toward achieving progress. 
Emphasizing the use of phenomenological approaches, this thesis is subjected to 
inspection by senior military leader (retired).  Congruently, personal experience as an Engineer 
Officer for reconstruction efforts in support of OEF will be expressed; as well as exposure to 
academic leadership involved with international affairs and community planning disciplines.   
                                                 
25
 The MDMP is a seven step process: 1) Receipt of Mission 2) Mission Analysis 3) Course of Action 
Development 4) Course of Action Analysis 5) Course of Action Comparison 6) Course of Action Approval 7) 
Orders Production.  A complete overview is found in FM 3-21.20 Infantry Battalion.   
  72 
In essence, this thesis is validated through multi-faceted perspectives, colleague 
reviewing, and qualitative and historical evidence.  It is enthralled on social, cultural, and 
organizational issues that are recognizable through multi-party collaborative participation.  It 
endorses a systematic approach to providing a progressive alternative to post-conflict 
reconstruction methods set forth by US Army reconstruction teams. 
Process 
Inadvertently, the research process for this thesis began in 2008 as I deployed to 
Afghanistan as an Engineer Officer in the US Army.  Tasked to help rebuild infrastructure for 
the Afghan National Army and recon areas to apply CERP
26
 funds, I became enthralled with how 
US taxpayer‟s money was applied to reconstruction efforts and if the desired impact was being 
achieved.  Key observations instigated the inquiry of this thesis, chiefly being: 1) Hearing the 
concern of Afghan Brigade Commanders not being offered opportunity to provide input into the 
planning process, design, and implementation of reconstruction measures on “their turf”;  2) 
Lack of US cultural consideration in the design of structures and use of furniture and appliances, 
and how these integrate with Afghan lifestyles, specifically concerning hygienic conditions;  3) 
Lack of US support after construction occurs, specifically the security for protecting children 
after an education facility is built;  4) Lack of women and children social care, specifically 
women sitting on the ground in traffic begging for charity; and  5) Lack of US Army 
organization and leadership to understand where, how, and who needs specific reconstruction 
efforts.   
                                                 
26
 CERP funds provide military commanders a process to initiate stability tasks which includes agendas 
such as reconstruction of infrastructure and humanitarian relief.  Depending on circumstances, funding 
cannot exceed $500,000 per project unless authorized by the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller.  
CERP funding at the Brigade Commander levels do not exceed $200,000 per project.    
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These observations began as unstructured data collection of personal reconstruction 
planning experiences as an US Army Engineer Officer in the post-conflict Afghanistan society, 
in which was found inordinate methods to increase the stability and security of an area.  The 
measures I observed to reconstruction planning involved two approaches.  The first approach 
was a lackadaisical cultural approach, in which the host-nation Afghan interpreters were asked to 
identify areas on a map that could be set up for reconnaissance to further investigate, or deliver, 
specific humanitarian or reconstruction needs.  The second approach was to collect empirical 
information from US Army field combat units which had access to various areas within the 
country and could report recommendations for humanitarian or reconstruction efforts (i.e. needed 
water access points, hygienic improvements, and medical services).   
The methodology of creating this thesis occurred in consecutive steps, illustrated below: 
1. A problem was identified through personal experience 
concerning US Army methods into post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
2. An observation process occurred, in which the problem was 
validated through reflection of further post-conflict 
experiences and processes. 
3.  Learning objectives about the US community planning 
discipline where achieved to further investigate alternatives to 
post-conflict planning experiences. 
4. Analyses of recent criticisms of post-conflict reconstruction 
teams were researched for validation and context of a broader 
issue. 
5. Historical research into WWII, Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq post-conflict and policy analysis were compared to recent 
criticisms expressed by HASC. 
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6. Graduate level education and personal experiences were 
intersected with research into current US Army reconstruction 
team operations, guiding policy, and methodologies. 
7. Framework for supplementing guiding policy (FM 3-07) was 
created through in-depth research of local US comprehensive 
planning models and investigated post-conflict criticisms, 
policy, and methods. 
In summary, personal experience began the process of this thesis and was coupled with 
exposure to comprehensive planning as instructed through graduate work.  Planning concepts 
and theories were studied to lay the ground work for a post-conflict planning model to 
supplement FM 3-07 and provide a tool to US Army leadership to better equip them to subdue 
future Congressional criticism. 
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CHAPTER 4 - Analysis 
"To every man there comes in his lifetime that special moment when he is figuratively tapped on 
the shoulder and offered a chance to do a very special thing, unique to him and fitted to his 
talents.  What a tragedy if that moment finds him unprepared or unqualified for the work which 
would be his finest hour." 
 - Sir Winston Churchill 
 
The analysis of this thesis is to examine the current methodology into planning 
reconstruction efforts in post-conflict societies for US Army reconstruction teams who adhere to 
guidelines of FM 3-07 and provide a supplemental reconstruction method through a proposed 
post-conflict planning model.  This analysis is broken into two segments in order to clarify the 
complexity of reconstruction learning objectives.  First, a study of the nature of whole of 
government planning reconstruction efforts as indicated in FM 3-07 will be studied for it 
effectiveness; and second, a study of the nature of comprehensive planning processes as 
supplemental guidance to reconstruction efforts as laid out in FM 3-07 will be studied for a 
possible solution to criticism of reconstruction teams operating in a ad hoc manner. 
FM 3-07 is a unique approach to writing US Army doctrine.  It encompasses a whole of 
government approach to the ideas and curriculum needed to reconstitute broken physical and 
social infrastructure while incorporating supplemental information and experiences from the 
international community.  In fact, according to a panelist reception of FM 3-07 of which 
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Lieutenant General William Caldwell
27
 co-hosted, there was only one US Army Officer, 
Lieutenant Colonel Steve Leonard, who authored its publication on behalf of the US Army (The 
Brookings Institution, 2009).  This indicates that the comprehensive approaches to stability 
operations are majorly comprised of different organizations from civilian authorities.  
Understanding the nature of FM 3-07 guidance gives US Army reconstruction team leaders a 
unique perspective which is intended to fill the gap of military resources in order to implement 
civilian knowledge, experiences, and background (The Brookings Institution, 2009). 
Where the origin of FM 3-07 was enveloped from civilian organizations which were 
experienced with post-conflict reconstruction, the nature of the comprehensive planning process 
originated from the City Beautiful Movement in the 1890s.  The City Beautiful Movement 
instilled preliminary comprehensive planning approaches to improve social conditions and the 
physical environment by upholding civic priorities, which were ethically oriented toward the 
common good of the people (Peterson, 2003).  It also began a process to “…develop a sense of 
civic responsibility…”(Rosen, 1958) which instilled a democratic approach that encouraged 
society to be a part of the development of its physical and social environment.  Understanding 
the nature of the comprehensive planning process provides an alternative method to 
reconstituting and developing infrastructure in international post-conflict societies.  The analysis 
for comprehensive planning model can be of value to military personnel as a supplement to FM 
3-07 because it retains the characteristics of incorporating public leadership with public opinions, 
a method comparable to the whole of government approach.  In this manner, a comprehensive 
                                                 
27
 Lieutenant General Caldwell was the Commander of the US Army‟s Combined Arms Center from 
JUN2007 to MAY2010.  His position is the Officer in Charge for approving the publication of US Army Field 
Manuals. 
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like planning model can be easily understood and applied to FM 3-07, and done so without 
imposing complications of interpreting planning and development meanings. 
The‎Nature‎of‎„Whole‎of‎Government‟‎and‎„Comprehensive‎Planning‟ 
The whole of government approach, as described in FM 3-07, can potentially be a 
boundless contribution of USG resources concerning reconstruction efforts.  Defined as “…an 
approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United 
States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal” (p.1-4), FM 3-07 attempts to 
coordinate multi-organizational tasks and methods, through a process called „line of efforts‟28, in 
order to achieve mission objectives.  Essentially, this doctrine endorses the involvement of 
specialized civilian teams, incorporated with military tasking and resources, to operate in a 
synchronized manner in order to reconstitute some post-conflict society.  Despite the objectives 
of FM 3-07, HASC continues to criticize reconstruction efforts, specifically those of the PRT, as 
being decentralized; meaning these units are not established, coordinated, synchronized, nor 
controlled to meet a desired end state.  Oddly, the whole of government approach was conceived 
to limit these circumstances.   
A major component of whole of government approaches is to “…avoid duplication of 
efforts, interfering with the plans of other departments, and the consequent waste of energy and 
resources”(Baker, 2007).  This is, therefore, a fundamental discrepancy which challenges the 
effect of reconstruction teams; if there is no principal overseer, which is an observation verified 
by HASC reports, then control of reconstruction objectives becomes fragmented and difficult to 
                                                 
28
 Lines of efforts are the commander‟s ability to coordinate and control the objectives of tasks from 
multiple organizations in order to create conditions of a desirable end state.   
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manage and assess.  If US Army reconstruction teams cannot be managed effectively, then their 
primary tasks will be difficult to achieve. 
The comprehensive planning process strongly correlates to the whole of government 
approach in that, in a locality, it utilizes multi-faceted civilian and government efforts to create a 
democratic process that aims for a desired end state.  In fact, the Standard City Planning 
Enabling Act of 1928 set out the purpose of comprehensive plans as (Department of Commerce, 
1928): 
The plan shall be made with the general purpose of 
guiding and accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted, and 
harmonious development of the municipality and its 
environs which will, in accordance with present and future 
needs, best promote health, safety, morals, order, 
convenience, prosperity, and general welfare as well as 
efficiency and economy in the process of development… 
 
The nature of the whole of government approach and the comprehensive planning 
process embodies all-inclusive contributions of civilian and governmental organizations, in a 
collaborative and agreed upon effort to develop some society.  Where the nature of organized 
comprehensive planning processes date to the City Beautiful Movement of Washington, D.C.  in 
1902 (Peterson, 2003), a collaborative approach to creating doctrine for the US Army came 
across the authoring of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency in 2006 (The Brookings Institution, 2009); 
and even so, this manual focuses on the ability of Soldiers and Marines to blend combative 
responsibilities with those that are generally conducted by civilian agencies.  Therefore, in 
essence, the true nature of whole of government approaches for US Army reconstruction teams 
begin present day with the implementation of FM 3-07 in 2008.   
  79 
FM 3-07 
Planning Framework for Reconstruction Efforts 
The US Army‟s planning framework for reconstruction efforts is tied into doctrine of a 
stability operations assessment process in Appendix D – Interagency Conflict Assessment 
Overview of FM 3-07.  The framework is designed to entice stability in a region by focusing 
efforts of five integrated sectors for conducting operations.  Figure  4-1: An integrated approach 
to stability operations shows the stability tasks which evolve into the five stability sectors.  These 
are the guiding vision behind stability operations.   
Figure  4-1: An integrated approach to stability operations. 
 
Source: FM 3-07(2008). 
As described below, this framework consists of the basic elements of any planning 
process (p.  D-10): 
 Collection of Data 
 Analysis 
 Design 
 Evaluation 
While this framework encompasses a plethora of actions, it may be unsuitable as the 
primary source which directs reconstruction processes.  It does not account for specified 
measures or approaches which are inherent to achieve a purpose.  Also, it is not bounded by 
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ethical obligations focused on the health, safety, and welfare of society.  Instead, it generalizes 
that experiences of commanders are fluent in reconstruction efforts, which may be unfitting for a 
doctrine designed to provide one-the-ground „how-to‟ directions during conflict and post-conflict 
operations. 
This Field Manual relies on an invalidated assumption that “For every operation, 
commanders develop personal, detailed understanding of the situation and operational 
environment.  They then visualize a desired end state and craft a broad concept for shaping the 
current conditions toward that end state.”(p. 4-1).  Realistically, the planning framework as 
illustrated in Appendix D of FM 3-07, provides the explicit foundation of all general procedures 
needed to solve a problem.  If the commander does develop an intimate and comprehensive 
understanding of the operational environment, it is still a difficult task conceptualizing broad 
concepts of progressive measures which are inherently limited by the actions of the host-nation.  
This reason stands, because the factors impacting reconstruction have a human dimension, which 
cannot always be accounted for or predicted.  And, as HASC reports, the coordination of whole 
of government approaches are not grounded through any process.  Therefore, the operational 
environment is moderated by dynamic conditions; as planning evolves so may the commander‟s 
concepts as he/she obtains new information.  Figure ‎4-2: Commander's Cyclical Planning 
Process visualizes how planning is a cyclical process in which commanders of reconstruction 
teams must analytically react to negative impacts.
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Figure  4-2: Commander's Cyclical Planning Process. 
 
 
Source: Author (2010). 
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What is shown in Figure  4-1: An integrated approach to stability operations is a 
systematic process for implanting a plan, recognizing its impacts, and re-implementing the 
planning process to a desired state that has less negative effects.  However rational the process 
looks, it is anything of the sort.  The contribution of the whole of government approach 
complicates many aspects of this process when control is not enforced or a hierarchy of decision-
making is ambiguous.  Data collected for the social and physical environment may be uniquely 
interpreted depending on the experience of the handler.  A US Army commander may not 
understand the data with the same results as a USAID member.  In the efforts of a PRT, where 
the US Army provides the majority of resources but a DOS official is the leader, there may exists 
friction in deciding what needs to be done and who needs to do it.  Possibly, the initial process of 
planning fosters criticism from the HASC because FM 3-07 does not outline objectives and 
responsibilities in a clear manner.  Instead, what is provided are fragmented methods and 
undefined processes. 
In the House of Representatives Report, HASC found that PRTs are decentralized, lack 
leadership, and are not given guidance by CENTCOM (US House of Representatives, 2008).  If 
this is the case, the first, and prudent, course of action would be to expound and investigate the 
organizational development of PRTs.  According to FM 3-07, these reconstruction teams are led 
by civilian DOS representatives who do not command PRT military personnel (p. F-4).  In 
response to HASC criticism, the assumption becomes: if DOS is the upper echelon of team 
leadership, how does guidance from CENTCOM come to play in the roles of PRTs? And more 
specifically, how does the interpretation of social and physical data of a post-conflict society, the 
segue to operational planning, juxtapose between civilian and military leadership? 
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What the commander contends with is unilateral direction and a balance between primary 
tasks and secondary tasks per the information he/she receives.  This becomes apparent by the 
guidelines of FM 3-07 and the criticism of HASC.  The information and guidance that a 
commander uses to begin his/her development of intent may be subjective in stability operations; 
depending upon who is providing information, how it is interpreted, and who dictates the end 
results.  Indeed, what appears to be lacking from FM 3-07 isn‟t whole of government approaches 
to reconstruction, that statement is made clear in the manual, but unilateral direction as to how 
these governments implement tasks alongside their military counterparts and how information 
pertaining to internal and external resources are collected and managed in a post-conflict society. 
FM 3-07 addresses the issue of coordinating efforts across a whole of government 
approach by endorsing the „essential stability task list29‟; where National Security Presidential 
Directive (NSPD) – 44 imposes that all USG departments‟ tasks adhere to DOS guidance 
concerning stability operations (National Security Presidential Directive - 44, 2005).  However, 
investigation into the Framework of Stability Operations by the USACE Afghanistan District 
North, only mentions higher echelon policy coordination with the DOS (USACE, 2010), and no 
mention of coordinating with the essential stability task matrix.  If this is a pillar of how the US 
Army applies reconstruction in a whole of government environment (Szayna, Eaton, & 
Richardson, 2007) it is not clearly defined as so in FM 3-07.  Therefore, the link between who 
delivers and interprets information and who coordinates specific tasks regarding that information 
is arbitrarily decided within the on-the-ground reconstruction leadership, and this may only 
                                                 
29
 FM 3-07 explains that the DOS controls stability operations.  The primary measure for control and 
coordinating whole of government tasks is through the essential stability task matrix.  There are five components of 
tasking: 1) Security.  2) Justice and reconciliation.  3) Humanitarian and social well-being.  4) Governance and 
participation.  5) Economic stabilization and infrastructure (p.2-5). 
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happen when the commander has a comprehensive understanding of all USG agencies operating 
in his/her area of operation.    
Where processes are “… orchestrated series of occurrences that are systematically linked 
to one another…” to serve a function (Rescher, 2000), they must begin with inquiries, 
information, and analysis.  If FM 3-07 claims to show the on-the-ground- soldier how stability 
operations occur in a whole of government approach to reconstruction efforts, seemingly a 
process would be the binding entity that coordinates these efforts; and hopefully it would be 
explained as so through some controlling mechanism.  Who controls tasks is fundamental to 
effective leadership, and how efforts are assessed is fundamental to understanding progress.   
Figure  4-3: Whole of Government Illustration, illustrates a glimpse of the internal 
environment of which agencies contend in stability operations, such as reconstruction.  It 
attempts to illustrate a comment Ms. Ginger Cruz
30
 made during an HASC Oversight and 
Investigations Hearing in SEP2007; where Ms. Cruz said “Iraqi officials commonly suffer from 
something we call interlocutor fatigue, where a whole parade of U.S. officials – a major, a 
colonel, a PRT team leader, a USAID guide, a contractor who works for USAID – will come in 
at various points and will meet with Iraqi leaders.  And so, it is very easy to see how Iraqis get 
extremely confused[,] and how PRTs spend an inordinate amount of time trying to coordinate 
and still fall short because there is too much coordination the needs to go on.”  The meaning 
behind this figure illustrates her point of a decentralized approach to stability, which also is 
proclaimed by HASC.  There is no catchment (authority) of agency efforts in this illustration, but 
rather a storm of efforts.  
                                                 
30
 Ginger Cruz is a former Deputy Inspector General for Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 
Her responsibilities included formulating organizational responsibilities during OIF reconstruction phases. 
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Figure  4-3: Whole of Government Illustration. 
 
This graphic portrays some USG agencies who contribute to reconstruction and stability 
operations.  It is provided to visualize the nature of the decentralized criticism by HASC.  
Notice there are no controlling factors or catchments for agency efforts.   Source: Author, 
(2010). 
 
If reconstruction tasking is not being controlled by DOS, as directed in NSPD-44, then 
relying on FM 3-07 to conduct on-the-field coordinated reconstruction efforts seems unsound.  
Where FM 3-07 states, “Within the USG, the [DOS] leads and coordinates reconstruction and 
stabilization operations, including activities to establish and support the rule of law.” (p.1-9, 
emphasis added), the coordinating efforts are not clearly defined.  For instance, the CERP 
Handbook implies that during project planning “…members of the unit staff coordinate with 
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other governmental organizations to synchronize efforts and verify they are not already pursuing 
similar initiatives.” (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008).  Creating a working link between 
FM 3-07 and the CERP handbook is challenging although essential in order to achieve 
Presidential Directives.  The CERP Handbook does not reference NSPD-44, which FM 3-07 
references as the lead agency for all stability operations and reconstruction as the controlling 
agency.  Herein lies the disconnect, in 2005 NSPD-44 was instituted, yet who and how it is 
enforced is not clear.  Reconstruction efforts were well underway before FM 3-07 was 
implemented in OCT2008.  However, as the co-authors of the Field Manual explain, it is 
“confusing” and “…the military will find it inherently frustrating…” but it is a manual which 
“… shows how to conduct [stability and reconstruction] operations…” “…geared for the people 
on the ground” (The Brookings Institution, 2009).   
Leadership and organization are monumental tasks.  In the US Army leadership is 
defined as the ability of a person to influence others to accomplish specified objectives.  Purpose, 
direction, and motivation are essential components of leadership which leads to how efforts are 
organized.  As doctrine which provides the process for stabilizing areas through reconstruction to 
create security in post-conflict societies, co-author Janine Davidson from The Brookings 
Institute
31
, exclaims that FM 3-07 describes “…how to do things, not why we do it, not where we 
do it, not when we do it.  That‟s up to the politicians.  That‟s important to understand.” (The 
Brookings Institution, 2009).  This declaration fosters uncertain directives set forth to 
reconstruction efforts.  It backs the efforts of reconstruction on political agenda and questions if 
                                                 
31
 The Brookings Institution is a public policy organization whose goals focus on: 1) Strengthening 
American Democracy 2) Foster the economic and social welfare, security and opportunity for all Americans 3) 
Secure a more open, safe, prosperous, and cooperative international system.   
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the politician or the soldier has a better understanding of what‟s occurring on the ground.  If the 
co-author claims that doing reconstruction is the only instigating factor towards reconstituting a 
post-conflict nation, then those efforts will most likely embrace challenges and longevity.  
Understanding why we use reconstruction as a stability measure increases our perspective on the 
actions that create positive impacts.  It is the “why we do it” concern that commanders need to 
understand in order to make effective decisions.  General Marshall figured this out rebuilding 
Germany.  His focus on „hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos‟ were the center of his 
reconstituting Germany efforts and increasing the quality of life of a decimated population.   
FM 3-07 challenges on-the-ground soldiers by its generality.  As the co-author points out, 
politicians drive „why, where, and when‟ reconstruction efforts occur.  The main objective in 
post-conflict situations is security, which shouldn‟t be any surprise considering security is 
inherent to our well-being
32
.  After essential services are restored in a post-conflict event (food, 
water, shelter, and medical) the process of reconstituting government through basic services 
should be clearly defined in order to promote the lasting effects of security of which the manual 
sets out to accomplish.  This cannot be accomplished when leaders rotate through deployments 
and the context of the operational environment is lost because a process was not followed.  These 
actions will further be challenged when policy clouds the professional and ethical judgment of 
progressive efforts needed to increase the quality of life through fostering health, safety, and 
welfare of the suffering population. 
                                                 
32
 See Abraham Maslow‟s Hierarchy of Needs.  http://www.deepermind.com/20maslow.htm. 
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Comprehensive Planning Process 
Urban planning principles and techniques in the US revolve largely around a 
community‟s comprehensive plan.  The comprehensive plan is the mechanism which 
orchestrates community development.  It is referred as the “…most basic plan prepared to guide 
the development of the community” (Levy, 2009).   There are eight goals of the comprehensive 
plan which are developed to sustain a society‟s health, safety, and welfare (Levy, 2009).  These 
are not all-inclusive, but through overlap may progressively maintain society.  Figure  4-4: 8 
Comprehensive Planning Goals as they Correlate to FM 3-07 5 Stability Sectors attempts to 
illustrate the correlation of these goals and the five sectors of stability task set out by FM 3-07.  
They are inherently similar, with the strongest overlap supporting Economic and Infrastructure 
Development.  This is hardly a surprise as infrastructure helps revive and sustain the economy, 
making it easier to predict the effects of certain development (USAID, 2006). 
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Figure ‎4-4: 8 Comprehensive Planning Goals as they Correlate to FM 3-07 5 Stability Sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author (2010).  From information obtained from John M.  Levy‟s Contemporary 
Urban Planning and FM 3-07. 
 A Model for Development 
Planning, just as post-conflict reconstruction, occurs in complex changing systems 
(Hopkins, 2001).  The nature of the comprehensive plan process and its goals are, indeed, 
familiar to the objectives of stability operations.  While there is overlap between these goals, the 
essence of both is to coordinate efforts so a desired future may be achieved and sustained.  In 
fact, planning in the urban discipline has five major implications which are, inherently, addressed 
in FM 3-07.  In this case, the five elements of planning methods construct a society by the 
following actions (Hopkins, 2001): 1) Planners guide and steer development: While unable to 
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control complex social and environmental systems, planners affect outcomes of complex systems 
by becoming a part of them;  2) Planning entails monitoring, continuous planning, and acting: 
Planning principles, and even those of reconstruction efforts, cannot be based on reaction and 
irrational decision-making.  The urban planner is versed in his/her environment, responsibilities 
of maintaining an agreed upon course, and inclusive and progressive decision-making; 3) 
Planners must be able to forecast complex systems in order to be prepared and effective: The 
planner who assumes the social and physical environment remains constant will find 
himself/herself incapable of making the best decision for their constituents;  4) Planners use the 
environment and resources around them to capitalize on opportunities and impede problems: In 
this way, planners are progressive.  They are not isolated from the environment of which they 
impact, but rather embrace it and exploiting resources to attain goals; 5) Planning actions are 
interdependent: A planner focuses on actions that are aligned with goals.  One decision or action 
affects how future actions are taken.  Planning maintains its course by focusing on goals and 
thoroughly understanding the implications of their actions.   
Both the comprehensive plan and stability operations focus on long-range planning and 
enduring effects.  Using these five elements of planning as a model for reconstruction efforts 
may drive US Army leadership to develop plans which are driven by interaction and 
conscientious development.  Still, where the comprehensive plan is mostly applicable as a 
reconstruction model lies within its ability to carry out these elements by coordinating society 
and local governments towards a common goal.  The local government - city, town, village, 
county, or parish - is the organization that creates and maintains essential and basic services for a 
community (E. D. Kelly & Becker, 2000).  While stability operations implement reconstruction 
efforts, these efforts are not designed for indefinite presence.  The US Army does not maintain 
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provincial responsibilities indefinitely.  There are limits to its assistance and amount of resources 
it offers.  It is for this reason an analysis of the comprehensive plan is an endeavor worth 
investigating.  The goal of a hybrid comprehensive and reconstruction planning process allows 
leadership to comprehend approaches to sustainable governments while exhibiting the health, 
safety, and general welfare of the host-nation. 
This fact, above all others, drives General Petraeus‟s infamous question of 2003 “Tell me 
how this ends?”33  There are at least two responses to this question.  The first being, this ends 
when the post-conflict society can sustain self-governance in a manner that maintains the 
minimum standard of life – food, water, shelter, sanitation, healthcare, rule of law, governance, 
and infrastructure.  The second response is more detailed, and pertains to a different perspective 
of the question.  In this case, the question evolves to, “Tell me how this ends.”  In this form the 
question derails from an explicit answer and requires an analytical reply.  How this ends, doesn‟t 
require a informal response as much as it requests an explanation of a method.  This form is 
altered from a question to a directive.  It is in this manner that the comprehensive plan can assist 
as a model for development to increase the likelihood of a self-sustaining post-conflict society.  
This notion is offered for support of USG leadership who continue to strive for appropriate 
measures in order to be increasingly effective and efficient in their strategy. 
Efforts of stability operations in Afghanistan are challenged with efficacy (as well as 
reconstruction planning efforts in Haiti, similar efforts in Somalia in the 1990s, and efforts in 
                                                 
33
 Rick Atkinson, embedded reporter for The Washington Post, spent considerable time with General 
Petraeus in Iraq of 2003.  He later chronicled his experiences in the book In the Company of Soldiers, of which the 
question General Petraeus asked routinely “Tell me how this ends?” fueled political debate to the militaries strategy 
of ending war in Iraq.  As of recent, the question has been transposed to a statement and redeemed to President 
Obama for a response to closure of war in Afghanistan. 
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post-war Germany before the Marshall Plan).  National Security Advisor, Secretary of State, and 
Noble Peace Prize winner, Henry Kissinger, proclaims that current USG strategy of stabilizing 
post-conflict societies by primarily reconstituting national governance and “…creat[ing] a 
central government, help it extend its authority over the entire country and, in the process, bring 
about a modern bureaucratic and democratic society” is a strategy that cannot succeed 
(Kissinger, 2009).  In this remark, Kissinger‟s allures that in Afghanistan an incompatibility for 
the USG to orchestrate such a difficult goal is given in part due to the social dynamics, the effect 
of years of civil war, and Afghanistan‟s “forbidding territory”.  Reconstituting a national 
government and putting forth the efforts to make it self-sustained extend across a broad time 
horizon and are better suited if it occurs in a bottom-up method.  Evidence of this is not only 
transparent through Afghanistan, but may be relevant to the current Haiti situation where over 1 
million Haitians live in dilapidated housing with sub-standard quality of life while the US Army 
coordinates with Haitian national governance to build schools.   
 While PRTs are intended to share reconstruction efforts through provincial governors, 
there remains a need for more emphasis on local and regional efforts (Kissinger, 2009).  
Population commitments at tribal groups, and the local community, are where the strongest sense 
of loyalty lays.  These local levels of governance have the most access to people and security
34
; 
also, looking no further than our own local police, local security is more prudent than what 
national government tends to offer (Etzioni, 2009) .  The comprehensive plan fits into this mold 
because the process it entails is centered on local community leadership, where government most 
often and directly interacts with the society (E. D. Kelly & Becker, 2000). 
                                                 
34
 In this sense, the word security is not traditionally thought of as the uniformed police, but rather tribal 
and community social leadership. 
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As previously stated, the basic elements of a planning process are not unique between 
FM 3-07 and the comprehensive plan.  The process entails the collection of data, analysis, design 
of a plan, and implementation and continual evaluation.  These steps create the framework for 
planning, but do not suffice for a specific methodology.  Whereas, the comprehensive planning 
process, while never operating as an all-inclusive guide, considers specific factors in a 
collaborative approach by searching for methods to enforce the public‟s health, safety, and 
welfare, FM 3-07 offers fragmented information, organized loosely on the commander‟s ability 
to control the operational environment.  Figure  4-5: The Comprehensive Planning Process 
attempts to illustrate the method.  In every approach is underlined „ongoing public and agency 
participation‟.  It is this approach that is the basis for strong, community oriented development. 
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Figure  4-5: The Comprehensive Planning Process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Pointer, 2008).
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Leadership 
The comprehensive planning process begins with leadership.  In order to enforce and 
tailor planning processes on behalf of the community, there must exist a point of unilateral 
direction.  Without this critical element, the comprehensive plan would be discombobulated and 
nothing more than a collection of documents; where policy and guidelines are only as effective 
as the entity that enforces them.  Leadership provides the control and synchronization of 
planning efforts in a community.  Typically, this leadership is organized in some form of 
committee, such as the Planning Commission or Planning Board.  Luckily for the US Army, 
leadership for reconstruction and stability operations has been ultimately allocated to DOS per 
NSPD-44.  While DOS is the ultimate agency for responsibility, they should not be the sole 
proprietors of definitive decisions on high impact reconstruction projects.  Rather, DOS should 
enhance the whole of government approach through mitigation and organization by establishing 
a headquarters which houses the planning process.  In this manner, DOS becomes the 
organization of accountability and has access to the resources of other USG agencies involved in 
reconstruction efforts.   
Leadership, coordination, and collaborative methods are fundamental theories of urban 
planning principles; where planners “…come to understand that problems will not be solved by 
one expert, but by pooling expertise and non-professional contributions as well; not by formal 
procedures alone, but by informal consultation and involvement; not predominantly by strict 
reliance on data bases, but by careful use of trusted „resources,‟ „contact,‟ „friends,‟; not through 
formally rational management procedures, but by internal politics and the development of a 
working consensus; not by solving an engineering equation, but by complementing technical 
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performance with political sophistication, support-building, liaison work, and , finally, intuition 
and luck” (Forester, 1980).  This leadership theory and guiding planning principle fosters 
community development contiguously with FM 3-07 and NSPD-44 whole of government 
approach.   As the DOS embraces leadership roles to build and direct strategies, US Army 
reconstruction teams may better coordinate and synchronize efforts when they have a 
conventional understanding of the nature of planning about which Forester remarks.  Figure  4-6: 
Transition to Unilateral Direction attempts to illustrate new whole of government coordinated 
efforts to reconstitute a broken society.  It exemplifies a whole of government approach where 
USG agencies do not operate as separate entities, but as a collection of different resources 
sharing a common goal (putting the pieces back together).   
Figure  4-6: Transition to Unilateral Direction. 
 
Source: Author (2010). 
 
Ethics 
Where leadership coordinates the physical efforts of reconstruction teams, ethics 
coordinates the rule of conduct of those involved in reconstruction development.  Ethics in the 
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US Army bind moral behavior and good conduct.  While good conduct is sometimes subjective, 
it is a soldier‟s responsibility to be prepared to understand the unconstructive or egotistical 
effects of his/her decision-making.  It is even more imperative to be prepared in times of war, 
when policy decisions which have shown “…blurred moral, ethical, and legal lines that Soldiers 
have long been trained to observe and uphold” (Moten, 2010).  Ethics provides an understanding 
and gives decision-making boundaries to the US Army‟s operational environment.  Where the 
US Army adheres to general ethical guidelines known as The Soldier‟s Creed, it must also 
consider ethical basis for the sub-discipline of reconstruction efforts in post-conflict societies in 
order to maintain a progressive course that is common as soldiers‟ transition through 
deployments.   
Ethical principles for urban planning officials who implement the comprehensive plan are 
developed by the American Institute of Certified Planners and the American Planning 
Association.  They are centered on three categories: 1) Serve the public interest; 2) Achieve high 
standards of integrity and proficiency; and 3) Continuously pursue improvements in competence.  
For the interest of comprehensive planning as a post-conflict development model, „Serving the 
public interest‟ details are provided to illustrate approaches to foster an enduring self-governing 
community, as follows
35
: 
1. Recognize the rights of citizens to participate in planning 
decisions; 
2. Strive to give citizens (including those who lack formal 
organization or influence) full, clear and accurate information on 
                                                 
35
 For a complete understanding of all three categories of planning ethics, visit: 
http://www.planning.org/ethics/ethicalprinciples.htm. 
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planning issues and the opportunity to have a meaningful role in 
the development of plans and programs;  
3. Strive to expand choice and opportunity for all persons, 
recognizing a special responsibility to plan for the needs of 
disadvantaged groups and persons;  
4. Assist in the clarification of community goals, objectives and 
policies in plan-making;  
5. Ensure that reports, records and any other non-confidential 
information which is, or will be, available to decision makers is 
made available to the public in a convenient format and 
sufficiently in advance of any decision;  
6. Strive to protect the integrity of the natural environment and the 
heritage of the built environment;  
7. Pay special attention to the interrelatedness of decisions and the 
long range consequences of present actions. 
 
According to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy, FM 3-07 is 
“…first and foremost a document that provides guidance to the Army on how to better prepare 
for difficult challenges, it also helps to inform policymakers and the American public about why 
it is so important that we provide improved interagency capacity and planning and guidance to 
compliment the military‟s capabilities as they support and defend American interests in stability 
operations” (The Brookings Institution, 2009).  Given the significant role of impacting on-the-
ground efforts and reconstruction policy, leadership must be oriented to foster progressive 
policy.  Progressive policy must be centralized on the best interests of the host-nation.  It must 
consolidate whole of government efforts to instill self-governance of the host-nation.  By 
creating grounded ethical causes of reconstruction, USG agencies may have a more enduring 
impact on creating self-governance and security in a region.  Where urban planners typically 
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adhere to the public‟s health, safety, and general welfare, US Army reconstruction teams can 
enforce a similar ethical code.  By doing so, it keeps a „checks and balance‟ process in place of 
which USG agencies assist each other in maintaining progressive and familiar measures. 
It is the efforts of strong leadership, backed by sound ethics, which will create the better 
procedures to accomplish any group tasks.  Even though goal-finding is an obstinate task (Rittel 
& Webber, 1973), it is most likely better developed when those who are creating a goal have a 
comprehensive understanding of who, why, how, and what impact they may have.  It is therefore 
thought, that during the goal setting stage of US Army reconstruction efforts, a foundation of 
professional ethics can create more long-term effects. 
Data Collection and Analysis  
Data collection of the existing conditions of social, environmental, infrastructure, and 
economic data gives urban planners the operational environment for the comprehensive plan in 
much of the same way that the intelligence discipline gives civil-military personnel an overview 
of the operational environment during combat, training, and peace keeping missions.   As with 
all steps of the general planning process, procedures may be enhanced, but conducting a step 
half-heartedly sets up a more un-predictive environment.  Data collection is a prime example of 
this.  The methods to data collection
36
 are meant to keep meaning and context to information for 
decision-making.   Generally, an urban planner understands this principle by making 
himself/herself aware of the concerns of the public through personal involvement (Forester, 
                                                 
36
 The five step process to data collection is: 1) Clarify data collection goals – why are you collecting data? 
2) Develop procedures to answer what you are trying to evaluate 3) Plan for consistency – ensure data is collected 
comprehensively, pragmatically, and similarly 4) Synchronize collection efforts and get off to a good start 5) 
Remain on track with goals and objective (Joiner Associates Incorporated, 1995). 
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1980).  The goal of a whole of government approach to data collection invests in personal 
involvement and is outlined in FM 3-07 Appendix D Section 49 as: 
 Has the population of the village changed in the last twelve months? 
 What are the greatest problems facing the village? 
 Who is trusted to resolve problems? 
 What should be done first to help the village? 
 
These goals strongly correlate to data collection principles for creating elements of the 
comprehensive plan.  The goals provided in FM 3-07 are fixated to developing a story.  Urban 
planning theorist John Forester supports the development of a story to address planning issues 
because stories provide a view of the social ways of a community which cannot be expressed on 
paper or digits.  He emphasizes the importance of listening to stories for context of situations, 
and how to listen for before jumping into theory to address an urban development circumstances 
(Forester, 1999).  Data collected in a whole of government approach benefits from the questions 
addressed in Appendix D of FM 3-07 by adding an element of context to US Army decision-
makers.   
Once data is collected, the analysis begins for planners and is commonly expressed and 
managed in maps through Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
37
.  The US Army has the 
capability of a similar approach by coordinating open-source GIS data from the National 
Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the Human Terrain System
38
, and civil-military personnel - CIA, 
                                                 
37
 To understand how this data is arranged and stored in a US community visit Albany, OR website at: 
http://www.cityofalbany.net/it/gis/datausers/index.php?view=ShapeFiles. 
38
 The Human Terrain System is a hardware/software package developed for experienced civil-military 
operators in order to provide a commander with details of the operational environment.  For more information visit: 
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USAID, DOS, USDA, USACE, and the international community - operating on-the-ground to 
begin development of a spatial database of existing conditions.  There are two primary 
characteristics which should be embraced when using GIS to manage spatial characteristics 
across some geographical area.  The first, GIS databases created for analysis must primarily be 
managed by one entity.  It is conclusive to match this responsibility to the leading organization.  
Urban planners most often have a working knowledge of GIS because much of their decisions 
are based on spatial references.  With GIS, planners transpose digital layers of corresponding 
information to understand a comprehensive impact; thus, if a road network was proposed for a 
specific geographic area, it could be transposed on land plats to understand what and who will be 
affected by its construction.  In a similar approach, during reconstruction in post-conflict 
societies, if a road is proposed in a new community, there must be an understanding of how that 
road affects adjacent communities.  Will it detract from a community, or cause it to grow? If 
growth is the result, does the community have the infrastructure in place to sustain it? If it 
detracts, is US Army leadership engaging foresight which protects or maintain that community‟s 
quality of life?  
This simple example shows how data can be analyzed and portrayed to identify strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT).  SWOT, in the urban/regional planning 
discipline, is a analysis tool that helps understand the characteristics of a community and develop 
processes to make improvements.  In order for decision-makers to understand the context of how 
SWOT affects the community, there must include some type of public participation and 
interpretation of the environment.  Data from this process can create basemaps which delineate 
                                                                                                                                                             
https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/vdas_armyposturestatement/2010/information_papers/Human_Terrain_Syste
ms_(HTS).asp.   
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areas of responsibilities amongst coordinating and synchronizing efforts.  Similarly, the US 
Army uses a method known as SWEAT-MSO assessment, to analyze existing conditions of 
sewer, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other.   
What should be emphasized is that the organizational development of data collection and 
analysis may be inherent to leadership, but should follow guidelines of leadership and 
organization.  When data and information are inherent to one entity, it allows a point of reference 
for reconstruction teams to turn to for information.  This is imperative in civil-military 
reconstruction operations where personnel are routinely rotated through deployments.  By 
fostering a single point of information, personnel can begin to depend on sound and confident 
information that is continued through a familiar process in order to better impact societies.   
Identify Goals  
Goals provide direction to planning efforts and are the general aims of the community (E. 
D. Kelly & Becker, 2000).  While the approach is simple to understand, implementing goals on a 
whole of government approach, along with community leadership in a post-conflict community, 
can be immensely difficult to manage.  The human dimension of goals competes with many 
different political agendas.  On one hand, USG agencies contend with their departmental 
agendas.  A US Army reconstruction team leader may have opposing goals to a USDA 
reconstruction team leader; where one might focus on increasing security thorough the presence 
of police, the other might desire to instigate measures of crop development for the same purpose.  
Conversely, there lies contention between the host-nation community leaders, as opposed to 
provincial leaders, and possibly to national leadership and international influences.  For instance, 
the goal of prioritizing and improving specific dilapidated road networks may be argued between 
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community needs and national needs.  Furthermore, USG reconstruction teams may have 
different ideas of goals for road networks to have the ability to expand logistical services across 
different regions within the host-nation. 
A goal, in the sense of the comprehensive plan however, is a measure of development 
derived from a collaborative process between the public and the planning council.  Equally 
contentious, goal setting in communities, where similar culture and societal values are shared, 
can be the most complicated process for planners to manage (E. D. Kelly & Becker, 2000).  In 
these cases, this process typically entails a visioning workshop sponsored by the planning 
department of the local community.  The workshop sets out to solicit direction from community 
members in order to set objectives for comprehensive development.  It is this process which 
encourages a democratic approach and community invested efforts.  There are different 
processes to visioning workshops.  Some may focus on opportunity-driven approaches, where 
the community assesses its future on opportunity or constraints and identifies ways to exploit or 
repress those measures; some approaches may be issue-driven, where the community identifies 
critical issues and develops efforts to address those issues; some focus on goal-drive approaches, 
while the most complicated to manage, orient future development based on community 
consensus; other approaches focus on vision-driven, where community leadership express 
egocentric goals and the community has the opportunity to support or ratify what is being 
expressed; and finally, there is the blended approach, which is a hybrid of the any combination of 
the above mentioned (E. D. Kelly & Becker, 2000). 
No matter what approach urban planners adhere to, it is their professional responsibility 
to utilize a combination of empirical data, education, and experience to progressively drive 
community participation in order to develop common goals.  Planners must be able to respond to 
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community inquiries in a technical manner that informs them of the underlying reasons of certain 
proposals (Healey, 1996).  FM 3-07 upholds these principles, but does so in a generalist way.  
Described as „unity of effort‟, this goal making process is defined across the DOD as “… the 
coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not 
necessarily part of the same command or organization – the product of successful unified action” 
(p.1-3).  In other words, FM 3-07 acknowledges that cooperation, participation, and unified 
actions are elements of organizational goal development, but lacks description of how this “plays 
out” in post-conflict communities.  Reconstruction leadership may be counterproductive when a 
comprehensive goal development is not outlined in a field manual.  If US Army reconstruction 
teams do not include managed participatory goal development, than post-conflict societies may 
revolt in some manner to restructure USG reconstruction agendas to reshape the direction of 
efforts and policy in much the same way that contemporary 1960s American society did during 
human rights movements (Rittel & Webber, 1973). 
Goals setting in a post-conflict society must be done with experienced and well trained 
professionals.  However, this does not necessarily need to rely on the DOS to implement.  When 
US Army forces take on this responsibility they must be prepared for principles in planning and 
communication.  The must be able to reformulate what post-conflict community leadership 
discerns as necessary goals, as opposed to an indigenous culture of telling a more resourceful 
entity what they think you want to hear (Wilson & Conway, 2009).  This, possibly, is the reason 
why over 1 million Haitians live in squabbles as the USACE works with the Haitian national 
government to build schools following the massive earthquake of JAN2010.   
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Formulate Alternatives 
The process of formulating alternatives in FM 3-07 is inherently unclear.  In the Field 
Manual‟s planning process this step is not addressed in a manner that allows a on-the-ground 
soldier to make decisions regarding this procedure.  In the comprehensive planning process, 
however, formulating alternatives provides frameworks for achieving comprehensive goals 
through different resources or different approaches.  Just as the path to meet economic goals are 
not analytically and innately created, the path to reaching goals that stabilize a society after some 
post-conflict will not always be replicable.  This occurs because of the dynamics of the physical 
environment and the human dimension of planning.  These cause uncertainty of how specific 
impacts of planning will be repeated.  For community development in America, a participatory 
approach to create alternatives to planning goals ensures that the community provides insight to 
the methods of attaining goals.  This is important because formulating alternatives involves the 
community.  It provides another forum for planners to understand the local culture, to develop 
and refine objectives, and to solve potential problems as the planning design begins to form. 
To account for the development of alternatives in the comprehensive plan, urban planners 
evaluate criteria with public input.  Figure  4-5: The Comprehensive Planning Process listed 
some of the criteria which build up the process of formulating alternatives.  The top criteria, 
goals and objectives, are discussed in a public forum and not by defining them from an isolated 
approach.  In this sense, planners may get a sense of priority in how to implement designs.  If the 
goal of the community is to create a public outside theater, planners may evaluate certain criteria, 
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such as availability of public and private funding, infrastructure requirements, need, and land use 
compatibility, and begin to discuss the probable course of action(s) needed to meet this goal. 
Potentially, this could be a powerful tool of which US Army reconstruction teams utilize 
to understand the extent of local resources and/or efficient methodologies to accomplish goals.  
For example, given the detrimental effects of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the ultimate goal, 
presumably, is to reconstitute infrastructure.  By conducting a „formulating alternative‟ forum, 
reconstruction team leadership may determine approaches to accomplish this goal by coordinated 
efforts of Haitians and the USG.  Where the USG could improve road conditions, it may be 
found out that the Haitians have the skill set and resources to repair sidewalks, or vice versa.  
This closely resembles the US Army‟s and USAID‟s approach to capacity building, but more so 
embraces a working solution to collaborative decision-making and reconstruction efforts.  
Specifically, it enhances capacity building by implementing participation procedures that exploit 
host-nation decision-making.  Also, formulating alternatives fosters the US Army‟s professional 
experience of reconstruction in post-conflict by orienting goals on essential and basic needs, 
rather than potential needs.  It gives a platform to implement professional and educated 
assumptions to local host-nation civilians. 
Evaluate and Refine 
Implementing the comprehensive plan requires control and synchronizing interdependent 
parts.  It also sets the conditions of the third step in the comprehensive planning process, 
„evaluate and refine‟.  The approach to implementing a plan which adheres to comprehensive 
planning measures is considerably different than implementing plans through stability operations 
in post-conflict societies.  Implementing a planning process has the luxury of being more 
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centrally controlled in the urban planning discipline.  Generally, plans and developments are 
controlled by planning and local leadership committees who maintain and enforce standards 
through land-use and subdivision regulations and ordinances.  This central control represents the 
importance of designated leadership mentioned previously.   
While the NSPD-44 directs the DOS to coordinate, plan, and implement reconstruction 
and stability operations it does not provide a method to do so.  In this, there is little 
understanding of how on-the-ground agency players utilize FM 3-07 to manage specific and 
synchronized efforts concerning how plans are implemented.  Instead, FM 3-07 reinforces that 
the whole of government approach will be composed of the Interagency Management System 
(IMS) established by the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization of the 
DOS (p.1-14).  IMS is a “…Washington-based decisionmaking body with an executive 
secretariat that serves as the central coordinating body for the USG effort” (p.1-14).  Its goal is to 
prepare whole of government implementation plans for USG reconstruction efforts, in post-
conflict societies.  Understanding how ground efforts utilize this information to implement plans 
is unclear in FM 3-07. 
A comprehensive approach to mitigating the implementation of reconstruction efforts 
from across international borders would entail having USG agencies, such as US Army 
reconstruction teams, to implement planning processes in community areas and report the 
information collected to a locally controlled DOS authority.  This method keeps decision making 
closer to the source of its impact and retains policy guidance as demonstrated in NSPD-44.  
Instead of sustaining a disenfranchised method of impacting post-conflict societies, USG 
agencies can create inclusionary argumentation, which is a valued system of knowing what 
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decision to enforce based on its meaning to a community (Healey, 1996).  In this sense, the 
decision maker has context of the operational environment and the impact of his/her efforts. 
Once the planning process has been implemented, leadership from USG agencies and the 
host-nation can expect unforeseen repercussions to the policies, plans, and ideas they propose.  
Their efforts must not stop at the physical completion of a specific reconstruction effort, but must 
be monitored to understand if their impact met the intention and facilitated a post-conflict society 
or decremented it.  This can be done through participatory measures that involve holding the 
host-nation responsible to reporting how the reconstruction project affected society and what 
were the repercussions.   Repercussions must be valued by their impact.  Participatory leadership 
must decide how the cons measure to the pros of the project and its plan.  If the repercussion is 
progressive in nature and benefits the general community without exploiting particular groups, 
than reconstruction teams can “bag” the experience, reference it, and hope to apply it in similar 
situations in order to predict further progressive efforts.  If, however, the repercussion creates an 
impact that is negative and detrimental to the community, then reconstruction teams must be part 
of the solution to remedy the situation.  These procedures are the basis for how evaluation and 
refinement take place. 
Additionally, when a planning process is implemented and needs to be refined, leadership 
can expect to readdress the planning process at the collection and analysis stage.  New 
information acquired might require a different decision to be made, or a conclusive examination 
of the pros and cons for maintaining existing planning measures; this is illustrated in Figure ‎4-2: 
Commander's Cyclical Planning Process.  When a problem must be implemented, but may have 
a negative effect on some part of society, it would seem imperative to reach a goal through 
communicative efforts and comprehensive planning methodologies mentioned so far.  The role 
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of the reconstruction team mitigates detrimental efforts by evaluating and applying a value 
system to consequences it imposes. 
A prime example of this is illustrated in Figure  4-7: Evaluate and Refine Problem 
Solving Example, where an existing road adequately services Village A and Village B, but is 
dilapidated from lack of maintenance to a point that it needs to be replaced.  As reconstruction 
teams plan and implement reconstructing a new road design, they realize that the existing 
environment and conditions are not cost-efficient to rebuild the dilapidated road and a proposed 
road is implemented.  However, this circumstance now ostracizes the inhabitants of Village B 
who require access to the road to sustain their livelihood.  In order to be successful in the 
ultimate agenda of creating sustainable governing communities and implementing efforts to 
generate security, the reconstruction team should utilize local leadership and comprehensive 
planning process to formulate a conclusive decision. 
Figure  4-7: Evaluate and Refine Problem Solving Example. 
 
Source: Author (2010). 
Policy Formulation and Adoption 
Formulating and adopting policy completes the comprehensive plan.  So far, the methods 
mentioned up to this point have centered on leadership, bounded by common principles, which 
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utilize information in an organized and collaborative matter to create measurements of 
development which lead to a self-governed and enduring community.  The comprehensive 
planning process is designed to meet a desired end, and must be documented in such a way that 
is understandable to the general public.  The plan, after all, is the public‟s rightful owner since 
they are the ones who fund it and contribute to it through democratic processes. 
As exclaimed in a panel discussion during the release of FM 3-07, the manual acts as a 
mechanism to influence policymaking towards informed decisions which exploit the capability 
of the military in stability operations (The Brookings Institution, 2009).  Part of this process is to 
include local decision making capability of the post-conflict society.  Their involvement has been 
the theme of the comprehensive planning approach to international reconstruction efforts.  The 
insight post-conflict societies can offer will help US Army reconstruction teams to understand 
the human-dimension of the operational environment and create more enduring effects.   
Once plans are comprehensively adopted, they must be available in formats that are 
understandable and accessible to the host-nation community and occupying agencies.  Doing so 
will enhance its prospects for adoption and will provided a point of reference  that can be used by 
the local community and reconstruction teams as they strive to make progressive decisions to 
stabilize the region (E. D. Kelly & Becker, 2000).   
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CHAPTER 5 - Conclusion and Recommendations 
“It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or 
where the doer of deeds could have done them better.  The credit belongs to the man who is 
actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly; 
who errs and comes short again and again; because there is not effort without error and 
shortcomings; but who does actually strive to do the deed; who knows the great enthusiasm, the 
great devotion, who spends himself in a worthy cause, who at the best knows in the end the 
triumph of high achievement and who at the worst, if he fails, at least he fails while daring 
greatly.  So that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither 
victory nor defeat.” 
- President Theodore Roosevelt  
Conclusion 
The Need of a Post-conflict Development Model to supplement FM 3-07 
As mentioned earlier, this thesis sets out to accomplish the recognition of a decision 
making model which US Army leadership may utilize to take into account the impact of 
reconstruction measures on the health, safety, and well-being of people who are transitioning 
through conflict.  According to recent Congressional Reports, news media, and non-profit and 
NGO studies, reconstruction teams are plagued with a lack of organization and the ability to 
implement goals.  Allegedly, this process has been undermined since post-WWII and continues 
in response to the Haiti earthquake disaster, OIF, and OEF.  This criticism is continually echoed 
in the discussions of today‟s military responsibilities through the media, USG leadership, and US 
Army leadership.  Methods are questioned in a manner that sequesters US Army reconstruction 
efforts and their ability to have an enduring positive effect on foreign nations.  Therefore, a study 
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of reconstruction team methodology as it pertains to the guiding doctrine of FM 3-07 is prudent 
to investigate in order to root out the causes of criticisms.  As has been shown in this thesis, US 
Army reconstruction efforts form policy and give guidance based from this Field Manual, which 
does not appear to grasp a clear post-conflict reconstruction methodology.  As a result, the 
population of which the US Army services post-conflict societies is susceptible to well-intended 
efforts, but unfavorable responses; and the on-the-ground reconstruction leader is left to make 
decisions based on incremental outcomes and not a strong source of reference. 
In this matter, FM 3-07 appears to need a model which encapsulates post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts.  Building a model within FM 3-07 reinforces the organization of 
reconstruction authority and provides a purposeful process which can be evaluated, 
implemented, controlled, maintained, revised, and, most importantly, transposed.  While 
methods and procedures are not new concepts to the US Army, they are routinely investigated 
for effectiveness.  The US Army looks for ways to encapture processes which are utilized 
through rotating leadership with the intention of maintaining context, command, and control.  
The most familiar of these is the decision making model known as the MDMP.  As illustrated in 
Figure  5-1: Military Decision Making Process, this process reinforces procedures of the basic 
problem solving process mentioned in Chapter 4.  The MDMP is nothing more than the scientific 
approach to solving military problems (Misigoy, 2010), but has had an enduring effect on 
military leadership.  It is familiar to soldiers, as well as other DOD agencies, and is a vital 
method to develop courses of actions on an objective.  It is implemented to compensate for 
austere conditions, such as when a leader is replaced - the incoming leader understands the 
direction of the predecessor‟s mission by studying his/her MDMP information.   
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Figure  5-1: Military Decision Making Process. 
 
Source: FM 3-21.20, Infantry Battalion. 
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While an post-conflict development model can be considered a tool for guiding US Army 
leadership, it does not solve every issue or create the absolute desired commander‟s end state.  It 
does, however, provide the leader a process, much like the MDMP, in which he/she may 
implement and reinforce leadership decisions, much as the way the comprehensive plan does.  
Where FM 3-07 lacks a reconstruction methodology, the comprehensive plan can provide a 
possible solution to measurable procedures necessary to reconstitute a post-conflict society.  The 
comprehensive and rational plan are “touchstone” (Hoch, 1993) guides that help form decision 
making which seeks to instill the health, safety, and welfare of its people through community 
influenced policy.  In much the same way, US Army leadership uses Field Manuals to guide their 
actions during mission planning and implementation.  In this, a model used as a touchstone can 
progressively direct US Army activities in a manner to achieve specific task.  Furthermore, when 
applied, a model can be used as a tool to measure response and activity. 
Models are tools for military leaders to help develop goals and manage progress.  The 
process for leadership decision-making must be conclusive in military disciplines in order for 
missions to be carried out in an organized and controlled environment.  Bringing a clear, 
understandable, decision-making process and expressed methodology for post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts to FM 3-07 is conventional to the nature of DOD operations.  If criticisms 
suggest reconstruction teams are disorganized, the only way to debunk those claims will be to 
investigate methods of organizational development and track measureable progress.  One way to 
accomplish these goals are to develop a post-conflict development model of with which US 
Army leadership is familiar, and use it as a tool that aims to create environments in post-conflict 
societies that are centered on health, safety, and well-fare.  It will be through these measures that 
a stable society will begin to emerge and foster events which lead to sustainability. 
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A Personal Experience 
In SEP2007, you would have found me at Fort Riley, Kansas preparing to deploy to 
Afghanistan as an Embedded Training Team (ETT) member to the Afghan National Army 
(ANA).  My pre-deployment training as an ETT member prepared me to mentor ANA soldiers,  
handle combative medical emergencies, combat/infantry tactics, reaction to improvised 
explosive devices, cultural awareness/familiarity, and command and control during uncertain 
events in the operational environment.  I spent three months with the 1
st
 Infantry Division 
learning the strategies and tactics needed to become “proficient” as an ETT leader.  The training 
was oriented to infantry tactics more so than mentoring methods, but provided me with a 
foundation of how to carry myself amongst foreign coalition forces. 
Upon arriving in Afghanistan, however, I was assigned to the Afghan Regional Integrated 
Security Command – South - Engineers.  I found myself emplacing buildings and structures on 
ANA bases and performed reconnaissance of emergency response requirements for the host-
nation population, all without having an understanding how these efforts interrelate with people 
and land usage.  My unit‟s decision making process implemented little consideration of the 
people we were going to impact, and more consideration for the guidance of our Afghan 
interpreter.  We emplaced a trust in him that was too great to be balanced with the needs of the 
people.  We deliberated and trusted in him, water-well locations, hygienic facilities, orphanage 
improvements, construction and operation of needed medical facilities, and any other 
construction issue of which we didn‟t have the resources to dictate ourselves.   
Then, during a foot patrol in Kandahar Province, it occurred to me that we (the greatest 
military in the world) were mismanaging our resources and capabilities in reconstituting this 
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worn torn and oppressed country.  The occurrence happened while I was teamed with one US 
Air Force Enlisted Generator Technician and embedded within an ANA company which was 
accompanied by a Canadian Operational Mentor and Liaison Team.  During this patrol, we set 
out to monitor the day‟s activities of the community, provide low level medical services, enhance 
the ANA‟s navigational techniques, and if possible engage the enemy.  The area was far 
removed from the protection of the coalition forces which protected the city Kandahar.  It was 
farther west and on the border of Helmand Province.  Helmand is inauspiciously known for the 
large number of Taliban forces, combat, improvised explosive devises, and Taliban supporters. 
During this patrol, we navigated through small communities and agriculture land.  We 
interacted mostly with children, and monitored our surroundings carefully.  The foot patrol lasted 
about six hours, and in between that time we came across a newly built school.  The structure 
was more new and brighter than surrounding structures, excluding a distant mosque.  It was 
encompassed by a mud wall which stood about six feet tall and coated with a pleasant earth tone 
white.  I noticed the ANA starting to take formation on one side of the school, and I remember 
pondering “What are they doing?!?”  I had no authority to intervene in their mission, nor was I 
apart of their planning.  I was simply asked if I wanted to accompany the ANA and Canadians on 
a foot patrol, of which I and my counterpart willingly volunteered.  We maintained position 
around the school for approximately 45 minutes.  As the ANA regrouped and continued the foot 
patrol, my element passed the school.  I then gathered more information about the site - it had a 
simple playground and looked like a well-suited building to school children.  A closer look 
revealed that most of the windows were broken and the school, while new, was empty.   
During the rest of our journey I tried to piece together the events and inquired why the 
ANA would take an offense approach on a school, and why the windows were broken and the 
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school empty.  A logical assumption occurred that the Taliban had gained control of the school 
and were using it as one of their assets.   
As we finished our patrol and regrouped at the ANA base, I inquired about the situation 
we had just experienced.  The answer given to me was – the US and Canada built the school for 
the local children.  Once the children started using the facilities, they were ostracized and 
tormented by Taliban and Taliban sympathizers.  The children‟s parents were harassed and 
eventually the Taliban forced the children to no longer use the school.  Instead of being utilized 
for its intent, as I suspected, the Taliban began using it for their needs.   
Later I learned, and would experience, that events such as these were not unique.  
Continually, I would be involved with construction of ANA facilities that did not involve ANA 
leadership collaboration.  I would be asked to be responsible for situations of which my technical 
expertise was far too limited for the profound impact my duties would have on human life.  
Oddly enough, the person I replaced on my deployment was a Lieutenant Naval Pilot, who 
admitted to having no desire or inklings into construction planning and methods, nor seemed to 
care about his impact on the population.  My commanding officer was a Submarine Engineer, 
and one of my teammates hadn‟t been in the military for six years.  In total, we were eight Air 
Force, Naval, and Army personnel with only one junior grade officer who was an experienced 
engineer and we were impacting the lives of ANA soldiers and Afghan civilians the best way we 
could; but, allegedly, our impact didn‟t account for who and how we were making a difference. 
Today‟s military personnel are often tasked to accomplish missions for which they have 
not been sufficiently trained for.  This is expected during times of war, and lack of experience 
and training is intended to be supplemented by procedures and methods found in Field Manuals.  
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When a Field Manual fails to provide clear methods to achieve intent, then how does one 
measure its value? What quality does it have if it cannot be used as an unambiguous instrument 
to direct actions and reference procedures? 
My personal experience tells me reconstruction efforts are important to reconstituting 
post-conflict societies and initiating a self-governing nation can provide security within its 
borders.  It tells me that where experience lacks, a dependency for precise and clear direction is 
needed.  It tells me that how we meddle in the affairs of our international neighbors in a time of 
need reflects our true character and purpose.  If we complicate the process and cloud 
reconstruction efforts with un-constituted policy, then we are not doing justice to those we serve, 
nor are we improving the security of a situation in the manner we set out to do.   
Today‟s reconstruction teams are making a positive difference, but I have experienced 
that their efforts are defragmented amongst the agencies and amongst different teams.  While 
some literature and studies indicate that reconstruction teams are now organizing and monitoring 
their efforts, there are still improvements the US Army should make in FM 3-07 to solidify how 
methods of planning reconstruction are carried out.  This thesis was written in order to provide a 
solution to consolidating, organizing, and planning those efforts.  It sets out to call upon those 
who can, to instill organized techniques that can be transposed amongst rotating leadership.  It 
challenges the effectiveness of FM 3-07 as a true on-the-ground resource that binds efforts 
amongst the whole of government approach.  It is written, so that the commander of the next 
“Haiti event” can recognize that as he/she drives through shantytowns that house 1.5 million 
people and of whom are amid cholera pandemics, just to build schools for children, that priorities 
and synchronization of efforts are being overlooked, which insure that the public has first and 
foremost their health, safety, and welfare interests represented.  Not through distant policy 
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making does this realization occur, but through the ethical guidelines and incorporated 
procedures that bind today‟s US Army leaders to ensure that the “right” thing is being done in 
reconstruction of post-conflict societies.   
Summary 
The evaluation of US Army reconstruction teams lends itself to more than merely 
critiquing organizational development issues.  There lies in reconstruction teams an opportunity 
and hope that a dire situation can be made better.  In that, the critique of reconstruction is only as 
good as the leader who is willing to investigate those claims and develop methods of how to 
improve his/her responsibility to reconstituting post-conflict societies.  What should be the center 
of reconstruction efforts are agendas that lead to peaceful and sovereign nations through 
progressive policy, clear objectives, and a formulated plan.  The goal to sovereignty happens 
through empowering the host-nation population through sustainment of basic quality of life 
principles, and is part of the overall goal of creating stable and secure regions following conflict.  
In order to instigate a self-governing region, local leadership must be validated through 
provisions it offers its population – health, safety, and welfare.  A government must develop the 
means to implement its judicial power and provide ways for the population to earn income, all 
the while maintaining internal integrity.  US Army reconstruction teams can be, and are, an 
integral component to development during post-conflict reconstruction.  They can become the 
catalyst which binds a process of cohesiveness, comprehensive reconstruction methodologies, 
and clear objectives to meet security goals through reconstruction. 
As the US continues to be involved in foreign affairs of reconstruction, there will 
constantly be a need to understand how our actions affect other parts of the world.  We cannot 
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operate in increments whose methods are nontransferable nor measureable, nor can we isolate 
agency participation in whole of government approaches to reconstruction agendas.  
Reconstruction efforts for the US Army must converge to a central arrangement that encourages 
command and control, that instills a presence of authority and responsibility, which has the 
understanding of efforts and impact, one which measures objectives and accounts for changes, 
and, finally, one that coordinates host-nation development through collaboration, knowledge, 
empowerment, and human-rights entitlements.  These ideas help orient today‟s US Army 
reconstruction leader to professional conduct that assists in decision making to insure the 
security of a defragmented and suffering population. 
The continual efforts to explore and develop methods of US Army reconstruction efforts 
matter because, literally, livelihoods are at stake.  People – children, women, disabled, the 
elderly, the oppressed, the tortured, the crippled, and families - are not always granted and 
blessed with the resources that exist in American society.  The US Army has a means to ensure 
the welfare and security of those who cannot provide for themselves in periods of post-conflict.  
It has the ability to change environments, to improve lives, to give a chance for independence 
where no chance existed before.  US Army reconstruction teams have the opportunity to improve 
quality of life, to construct shelter, to implement social and judicial justice, to plan out 
communities, to integrate and foster community involvement, and to fundamentally change the 
course of civilizations.  Our army is more capable and disciplined than any other army in the 
world.  The US Army is well versed to fight and equally accomplished in peacekeeping 
missions, all in the name of volunteered and selfless service membership.  Where situations 
require the best efforts, the US Army must continually strive to meet the world‟s expectations.  
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People in decimated areas depend on our army to save their lives, to change their environment 
for the better, and to expunge the wickedness which breaks down the sanctuary of communities. 
As with most changes in the way something is done, the process of improving the US 
Army‟s effect on post-conflict reconstruction will be entangled with pros and cons.  And even 
though criticism dictates that modifications in organizational reconstruction team efforts are 
necessary, US Army culture will embattle this change mainly through the logistical challenges of 
acquiring the “right” personnel and re-training the force.  Table  5-1: Pros and Cons of a Change 
to Current US Army Post-Conflict Reconstruction Methods illustrates and prepares the leader for 
the positive effects of improving US Army post-conflict reconstruction methods, and the 
challenges that each idea incurs. 
Table  5-1: Pros and Cons of a Change to Current US Army Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
Methods 
Change to Current US Army Post-Conflict Reconstruction Methods 
Proposal Ethical and Rational Based Reconstruction Methods and Policy 
Pros 
Sets comprehensive occupational standards; unifies inter-agency 
efforts; may reinforce host-nation quality of life and human-
rights issues; provides context of operational objectives; gives 
meaning for desired end state effects 
Cons 
Requires occupational "buy-in" and continual motivation for 
sustainment; allows for less flexibility in the decision-making 
process 
Proposal Centralize Leadership Authority in Reconstruction Efforts 
Pros 
Emplaces DOS as the accountable agency per National Security 
Presidential Directive 44; balances inter-agency resources; 
provides one-stop-shop for information; inherently organizes 
control and progress; defines the operational environment 
Cons 
Must determine how NSPD-44 is enforced; could create cultural 
differences between inter-agency objectives; could create 
resource management issues between inter-agency leadership 
Proposal 
Use of Local Reconstruction as a Means to Support National 
Governance 
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Pros 
Theoretically creates a progress and long-term impact to 
redevelopment; if managed correctly, can easily measure 
progress; develops host-nation understanding to give context to 
other operation within areas of responsibilities 
Cons 
The process requires extensive training of USG personnel in order 
to be implemented correctly; could be resource intensive; may 
require detailed and comprehensive planning; requires intimate 
knowledge of host-nation 
Proposal 
Adopting a post-conflict reconstruction model to supplement 
FM 3-07 for US Army Reconstruction Teams. 
Pros 
Provides the on-the-ground soldier context to operational 
procedures; lays out comprehensive courses of actions; can be 
used as a true reference to tasking where lack of experience exist 
Cons 
Will require subject matter experts to re-train the force; to be 
successfully implemented may require leadership to possess 
multidiscipline understanding (physical and cultural environment, 
politics, communication)  
Source: Author, (2010). 
If the US Army doesn‟t look at ways to improve its capability to reconstitute 
incapacitated societies, the consequence doesn‟t just fall to the host-nation populace, it is 
globally impacted.  Security becomes the ever-present issue in these circumstances; and those 
nations which do not operate with some type of developed governance, do not participate in 
progressive global issues.  They, instead, become isolated and volatile countries and are “eyed” 
because of their inability to coordinate control.  The oppressive and precariousness reign they 
may foster, creates ill-communication and an aurora of uncertainty.  The US Army does not seek 
to embrace these types of conditions.  Instead, it seeks to recover governance and human rights, 
but it cannot do so on unmediated procedures.  The organization is too big and complex, and the 
operational environment is often filled with too many uncertain factors.  Soldiers and leadership 
are, and have always been, expected to complete missions based on procedures, methods, and 
authority which limit uncertainty.  To ensure that life is preserved and livelihoods enhanced, the 
US Army is obligated to increasing the effectiveness of its force through better organizations of 
reconstruction efforts.   
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Recommendation 
Throughout this thesis, a course has been laid that illustrates the recent history of 
reconstruction efforts in post-conflict societies, their impact, and a review of their criticisms.  It 
is important to understand the role of US Army reconstruction teams in order to understand how 
the USG pieces together fragmented nations.  This study has challenged readers to weigh 
historical reconstruction events, with policy based reconstruction methods.  Inherently, what‟s 
involved with reconstruction efforts are the effects of livelihoods and global security.  The US 
Army must realize that methods of reconstruction efforts are worthy of in-depth study because 
they are the means to enhance and give opportunity to a society that has been stripped from its 
governance and are intended to promote the stability that the USG seeks to instill.  Also, US 
Army leadership is charged with the moral and ethical obligations to encourage acts that are 
proactive to USG directives.  When USG studies deplore the effect and efficiency of US Army 
reconstruction efforts, then internal investigations into organizational development and 
methodologies are valued for their aim to recourse efforts in a manner that support Presidential 
directives.   
 What is provided in the remaining portion of this thesis are four concepts of which FM 
3-07 can enhance in order to attend criticism and improve the development and methods of US 
Army reconstruction teams.  The first concept exploits the ethics to method based reconstruction 
policy and methods.  It illustrates that an ethical foundation is an appropriate foundation to bind 
collaborative efforts, while at the same time providing a valued framework of promotable efforts.  
The second concept illustrates the importance of a unity of effort that is controlled and not 
fragmented in its approach to solve issues.  This concept maintains that command and control are 
instrumental in military tasks, as they are the epitome of conduct.  Third, a bottom up approach 
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to stabilization is mentioned in order to emphasize the power of local community.  This is not to 
say that in post-conflict societies US Army reconstruction efforts seek to pit the community to 
national governance; rather, the local community is the mechanism of the national community.  
Before a nation is created, it is done so through the union of communities.  Finally, a proposed 
post-conflict development model is offered as a supplement to FM 3-07.  This model is offered 
as groundwork to further investigate the impact of current US Army reconstruction methods.  It 
represents a solution, and not the solution. It is developed through the correlation analysis of 
local US communities comprehensive plans, because the plans are familiar, effective, and instill 
the same type of stable characteristics desired in post-conflict communities. 
These concepts, while conceived empirically through a deployment as an Engineer 
Officer, and enforced through various experts, are mentioned to provide a solution to a known 
problem.  They may, or may not, be conclusive to solving the issue, but the intent here is to 
declare that an issue exist, it needs attention, and there are solutions. 
Ethical and Rational Based Reconstruction Methods and Policy 
FM 3-07 is a manual that influences post-conflict reconstruction policy and on-the-
ground US Army leadership efforts.  It is devised to create stability in regions which contend 
with a defragmented government as a result of some type of threat.  In reconstruction efforts are 
the deliberate actions to create the sovereignty needed to implement a quality of life that sustains 
the host-nation population, while providing a means to regain independence.  Reconstruction 
efforts primary effect is to create security, the residual effects are to foster an environment of 
independence.   
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Given these boundaries, decisions which directly impact the well-being of a population 
should not compete with unclear motives that are removed from the health, safety, and welfare of 
a suffering society.  An approach to anchor these efforts must be founded on ethics.  In US Army 
reconstruction efforts, ethics bind directives and exploit the health and prosperity of the host-
nation first and foremost.  Indeed, a nation prospers when it is secure, and it is secure as a result 
of its prosperity.  Where the natural cycle of community development in a nation contends within 
itself, the cycle of US Army post-conflict development efforts must contend with a desired end 
state.  How the US Army organizes ideals of prosperity are best suited if they are known 
throughout the reconstruction team discipline by some predetermined ethical standard. 
In this, ethics provides a context to efforts.  It reasons the importance of efforts and 
provides an inherent checks and balance within the reconstruction team community concerning 
cohesive decision making.  It gives value to the profession and sets it apart from other functions 
of military services.  A solution to binding reconstruction teams, to give them meaning and 
solidarity, is to provide them with an ethical statement.  Just as the DOD has authorized each 
military agency its own ethic standard (Department of Defense, 2010), the US Army has the 
means to provide ethical guidelines to sub-agencies/units which promote Army Values during 
the course of fulfilling missions and abiding by leadership. 
Forming the ethics which bind a discipline can be illustrated in many forms.  Ethics can 
become a list of values or principles, such as the USAIDs Nine Principles of Reconstruction; 
illustrated in 
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Appendix A - USAID Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development.  Or, ethics can come 
in a statement which aims to guide actions.  Finally, ethics can be distributed as a set of codes 
which orient the implementation of actions.  An ethical statement which binds reconstruction 
efforts for US Army teams may look similar to:  
In post-conflict society involvement, the US Army seeks first and foremost to prioritize 
the actions which value security, shelter, hygiene, and community betterment.  We 
recognize our responsibility to provide the basic needs of life, and will implement our 
resources in a manner that support human-rights, and foster community independence.   
Through interdisciplinary and cross-cultural collaboration, the US Army will enforce 
NSPD-44 as the means to stabilize decentralized foreign governments and improve the 
quality of life of those who are unable to do so for themselves. 
Centralize Leadership Authority in Reconstruction Efforts 
A whole of government approach, as set out in FM 3-07, insists that in order to achieve 
“…the balance of resources, capabilities, and activities that reinforce progress…” interagency 
coordination is essential.  This coordination, as determined in NSPD-44, falls on the shoulders of 
the DOS.  However, this study finds that organizations and projects, such as USACE and CERP 
funds, operate regardless of DOS intentions.  There is little evidence to support that the DOS is 
implementing the command and control of reconstruction efforts as the Presidential Directive set 
out to mitigate.  Reasons why the function and capability of DOS in reconstruction efforts are 
not the center criticism is unknown.  The leadership authority in these situations has been 
mandated and enforced by the highest political power, but their progress to organize and plan 
reconstruction efforts are undermined by the complexity of the situation, human-dimensions, and 
independent agency goals. 
In order to reclaim a command and control presence, DOS must coordinate internally and 
formulate progressive methods to unite different USG agencies, and do so through exploiting 
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NSPD-44.  Authority is only effective when it is enforced.  If DOS does not enforce its authority, 
a disorganized approach to reconstruction will continue, resulting in sustained criticism and 
immeasurable progress.  Secondly, DOS must instill operation centers where information is 
housed and collectable.  When US Army units implement reconstruction efforts, there needs to 
be a familiar source of decision making and leadership.  The US Army maintains control through 
rank in the “chain of command”.  As a mechanism to organize US Army efforts, the DOS must 
realize that it is the cornerstone of the development process, and falls within the chain of 
command. 
Centralized leadership creates points of contact which can assess progress and impacts in 
development.  Just as the Planning Board channels information and decisions through the 
comprehensive plan, the DOS can be the source to information US Army leaders can turn to in 
time of need.   
Use Local Reconstruction Efforts as a Means to Support National Government 
Most sustainable nations are formed when communities interlock and agree, or forced to 
agree, upon a set of standards.  Presuming that national governance is more capable than the sum 
of all its communities is a dangerous assumption which presupposes that political power is 
explicit.  Political power is not explicit, but equitable.  It‟s enforced through people who are 
bound to a code; or bribed, or coerced, or blackmailed, etc.  Political power is not a magical 
force which controls our actions.  It is the product of a group of people who share ideas and have 
collected the necessary resources to enforce those ideas. 
The power of community cannot be intrinsically replicated through the coercion of some 
outside entity; it must be encouraged and nourished through internal motivation.   In this, the 
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enduring effects of nationalism result from the collaboration and motivation of many 
communities.  The sum of communities builds a nation.  The community, after all, maintains the 
integrity of a nation.  If communities fail, how does the power of the nation make-out? 
These ideas support, what Henry Kissinger professes, as a bottom-up approach to 
reconstituting national governance.  In other words, US Army and DOS efforts may be better 
suited if they simultaneously develop local community ideals with recognition to national 
development.  The idea is that communities reinforce the nation.  They are not so much a product 
of the nation, but rather the means to put in place governance which looks to the best interest of 
its people across a broader scale. 
The process of fostering community development to sustain national governance is 
circumstantial to the context of the post-conflict society.  Where a society is economically 
limited before a conflict, the post-conflict situation cannot readily provide means to escape 
economic despair; however, a post-conflict event may provide an environment where the 
community is willing to re-identify itself as a stronger, more resilient entity.  Therefore, and 
maybe even suspect, a community approach to national governance would be enduring.  It 
becomes a mean to preserve nationalism, and not a manufactured organization instilled to 
support nationalism.    
A Proposed Post-Conflict Development Model  
The benefit of FM 3-07 to an on-the-ground soldier is, allegedly, impeded by its lack of 
clear methodologies.  As a reference to supporting NSPD-44, it may not provide today‟s soldier 
with a familiar, transposable, process which sets out to accomplish necessary tasks in support of 
a commander‟s intent.  Soldiers manage an inconceivable amount of internal and external 
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logistics and procedures during the implementation of any mission or tasking, any method to 
clarify any procedure is valued for its efficiency results.  For this reason, a systematic approach 
to conclude appropriate decisions during reconstruction efforts can be part of the soldier‟s 
“toolkit”.  This approach becomes an intangible, but very necessary, tool which directs efforts 
and has a deliberate affect upon the host-nation populace.  The systematic approach is 
consciously implemented through procedures, and known to urban planners as a method which 
“…selects a course of action (a set of means) for the attainment of his ends” (Banfield, 1991).  
Even though the ends in urban planning and those of reconstruction development are carried 
through by intrinsically different organizations, both aim to achieve the well-being of the 
population for the purpose of creating security.   What is offered in the following pages is a 
simple understanding of the elements of a systematic approach in post-conflict reconstruction 
and a proposed post-conflict development model.  These tools are offered as a method to obtain a 
“…clear and consistent set of ends” (Banfield, 1991) of which all participating USG agencies 
can orient towards. 
Elements of a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Decision Making Process 
FM 3-07, most likely, excels at defining objectives, but it lacks defining a model to reach 
those objectives.  It is good at defining policy, but lacks the ethics behind policy and how it is 
implemented in US Army leadership.  It defines leadership, but does not define how information 
is secured, distributed, and accessed through the hierarchy of reconstruction team members.  It 
describes the operational environment, but misses laying out a rational process to impact that 
environment.  It could be mentioned that FM 3-07 is good at providing overtly broad efforts to 
reestablish peace, but does so through objectives that are not well laid out or comprehensively 
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understood under reconstruction team communities.  It provides elements to reconstruction that 
are too vague, decentralized, and un-methodological.   
US Army leadership typically is aware that the on-the-ground soldier makes decisions 
best when he/she understands their operational environment and those who operate in it, know 
their areas of responsibilities, and follows distinct leadership that can manage and assess their 
efforts.  When these three components are within the soldier‟s understanding, he/she will be able 
to better implement their tasks, and provide the flexibility needed to meet the overall objectives.  
It is this reason that this thesis promotes a model of systematic approach to decision making in 
reconstruction efforts – in order for the soldier to understand their environment and operate in an 
efficient and effective manner, which instills leadership direction while positively considering 
the best interest of the host-nation.  These accomplishments are not done so by elements which 
are arbitrary, but rather an interconnected set of actions by various organizational responsibilities 
that all orient towards an assumed end. 
In order to maintain integrity of NSPD-44, US Army leadership takes into account 
resources from various other USG agencies.  This process supports NSPD-44 directives by 
reinforcing a whole of government approach.  As provided in  
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Figure  5-2: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Decision Making Process, a layout of the 
systematic approach to post-conflict reconstruction illustrates the elements needed to develop a 
course of action provided from a layout of the internal operational environment of reconstruction 
teams.  This layout, in and of itself, provides a conceptual, if not fundamental, map to the actions 
needed to develop an approach to planning reconstruction.  As a planning tool, it represents the 
assembly of the resources necessary needed to achieve objectives established within the 
reconstruction team (Dobbins, Jones, Crane, & DeGrasse, 2007).  It sets out to illustrate the basic 
components to developing reconstruction efforts and portrays them in ways that suggest how 
they interconnect.  It also emphasizes the organic
39
 nature of reconstruction teams, but its 
strengths lie within interpreting the elements to understand key players and their responsibilities.  
While some elements can be expanded upon, depending on the context of the operational 
environment, this model can be a tool to understand the different social, physical, and policy 
factors needed to reach a goal.   
 
 
                                                 
39
 The term „organic‟ in military terms suggest the degree at which a unit is self efficient.  If a unit is 
organic, it depends less on other units to accomplish its mission; whereas, if a unit in non-organic, it requires support 
from other entities to maintain operational effectiveness.  Organic reconstruction teams rely on their internal 
resources to accomplish missions.  The organic environment provides centralized efforts that are not confused with 
non-organic leadership and directions.  Non-organic reconstruction teams are reliant upon logistical measures which 
can prohibit them from accomplishing tasks; for example: a reconstruction team reliant on some other unit for 
security and transportation, its prioritized to that unit‟s leadership and mission requirements.  A team may not get to 
where they need to be and when. 
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Figure  5-2: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Decision Making Process. 
 
Source: Author (2010). 
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It lays out a simplified approach to how decisions come to be made; an approach that is 
distinct and recognizable.  If distributed amongst USG agencies operating in host-nation, this 
map distinguishes responsibilities and defines participation.  It ties in the efforts of multi-agency 
participation.  It shows that Descriptive Reports are needed to draw a Course of Action, and 
provides a setting in which the leader can implement direction to obtain those reports.  Anywhere 
in this layout you can point to some element and define the impacting variables which influence 
its implementation.  If Uncertainty is a mitigating issue, than the model can be used as a tool to 
understanding the factors which have an impact on Uncertainty – which are the Human 
Dimension and natural environment; Descriptive Reports; Social Input, Survey, and Professional 
Experience; and Objectives.  The leader then identifies the weak links he/she are contending 
with, and reaches an appropriate course of action to compensate.  For example, are Descriptive 
Reports too vague to assess the social situation of the host-nation; is the Human Dimension too 
complex and removed from western cultural ideologies that it creates doubt in the impact of 
efforts, etc.  Understanding the weak links creates motives to better understand the situation, 
therefore, providing the means to make a better decision on behalf of USG or host-nation 
leadership. 
If, however, one of the elements are overlooked, not implemented, or half-heartedly 
implemented, the course of action is at a greater chance of not meeting its full intent.  This is 
because each element of the layout is dependent on other element(s).  To increase the probability 
that reconstruction efforts meet a desired end state, each element must be defined and understood 
by the presiding leadership and distributed to the reconstruction teams.  This creates a point of 
reference when teams run into issues, and defines the operational environment in such a way that 
those issues have a direction to be remedied. 
  134 
Potentially in this model, we can observe Table of Contents for a FM solely dedicated to 
reconstruction efforts.  One which lays out the topics for an on-the-ground soldier who needs to 
fulfill their mission in the best possible manner they can, but may have limited experience in 
post-conflict reconstruction.  One which defines organizational responsibility and seeks to 
improve the mechanisms of reconstruction efforts in a whole of government approach.  One 
which maps whole of government participation and illustrates the operational environment and 
cultural response.  One which offers procedural techniques which are understood across various 
organizations and implemented in a similar fashion through transposing leadership. 
It is when a soldier can conceive an appropriate course of action through deduced means, 
such as this systematic process model, that he/she will have an impending effect from which they 
were sent out to accomplish.  With good information, comes good decision making.  The 
systematic approach modeled here, sets out to provide the soldier with the good information they 
need to make the right decision. 
A Comprehensive Planning Model for Reconstruction Efforts 
This thesis concludes with a proposed model to conduct reconstruction in post-conflict 
societies of which the US Army may abide by.  It looks to mitigate the ad hoc manner of 
organizational development of which current criticism is aimed, and offer a resolution that binds 
these types of efforts in a uniformed and controlled manner.  In this study is advocated a model 
that exploits the importance of leadership and policy which relates to host-nation interests, 
through a series of synchronizing and partnering efforts.  It plainly illustrates that methods to 
post-conflict reconstruction are headed by the DOS through NSPD-44 and founded on local host-
nation participation.  The US Army can best achieve the security it looks to create when it can 
  135 
implement the elements which create a functional hierarchy of leadership, comprehend known 
internal/external motives, understand the operational environment and whole of government 
approach, and familiarize themselves with a transposable reconstruction methodology. 
The urban planning discipline‟s comprehensive plan, plays into this model as a process 
that organizes and supports FM 3-07 by illustrating leadership, emplacing host-nation interest, 
and developing reconstruction strategies.  Illustrated in Figure  5-2: Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
Decision Making Process, this proposed model is not the solution to HASC criticism; but a 
viable alternative to reconstruction methodologies which lead to more organized and responsible 
efforts.  What is underlined in this model is the rational planning process.  The rational planning 
process must be the keystone which holds all other agency efforts together.  It is the plan, after 
all, which creates decisions with regard to courses of actions (Banfield, 1991).  Without well 
understood goals and an enforced unity of effort, courses of actions are distorted.   
In all, if a plan is not implemented, organizations will exercise efforts which are not 
harmonious to their counterparts.  Instead, they will develop internal plans whose objectives 
predominantly lie with their own understanding of the host-nation situation.  To keep 
organizations grounded to this plan, it must be at least understood by four categories: 1) 
Leadership of DOS, implemented by synchronizing efforts and directed by the NSPD-44; 2) A 
planning model, based on the comprehensive plan, which illustrates the process of the 
accumulation of information to implementing a plan; 3) Partnering with host-nation leadership, 
to develop local goals and identity; and 4) The rational planning process.
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Figure  5-3: Comprehensive Planning Model for US Army Reconstruction Efforts. 
 
Source: Adapted from RM Plan Group (1998) by Author (2010).
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Department of State Leadership 
Figure  5-4: Comprehensive Planning Model - Part 1. 
 
Source: Adapted from RM Plan Group (1998) by Author (2010). 
As mentioned before, NSPD-44 is the Presidential authority which assigns reconstruction 
leadership authority to the DOS for all USG agencies.  Figure  5-4: Comprehensive Planning 
Model - Part 1 (above) shows how this fits into the comprehensive planning model for US Army 
reconstruction efforts by establishing a source of leadership much as the way a local US 
community does with a Planning Commission.  Where, in urban planning fields, the Planning 
Commission is the “…body charged with both the power and the legal duty to prepare the 
comprehensive plan…”(E. D. Kelly & Becker, 2000), the DOS holds comparable authority by 
developing and enforcing policy to which reconstruction teams abide.   
This proposed model also demonstrates the need for DOS to continually communicate, 
monitor, and assess reconstruction team efforts (which as we will see, are followed through to 
include host-nation participation).  This is done through the management of information, and is 
carried out the same way as a local community plan.  Where a city manages development 
information in a comprehensive plan, the DOS could manage information at a headquarters 
which is accessible to reconstruction teams.  The information concerned with reconstruction 
efforts may be Presidential/key leadership goals, host-nation goals, social/cultural characteristics, 
infrastructure requirements, key concepts which are unique to the host-nation, community 
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identities, physical environment, housing requirements and existing conditions, economic 
background, natural resources, agri-business, existing land-uses, and human-rights.   
 This information can be managed through various different media – reports, web links, 
booklets, operation orders; but, as with the comprehensive plan, is best managed through a 
combination of documents and maps.  In the comprehensive plan, documents give the local 
community access to law abiding procedures, while the maps act as visionary tools that describe 
the community setting.  A similar approach can be carried out through DOS efforts by using GIS 
and the Human Terrain System.  The use of maps, in this case, becomes a tool that signifies 
cultural, physical, and infrastructure boundaries.  It acts as a guide to help delineate where USG 
agencies need to be involved.  As a resource for US Army reconstruction teams, a map enhances 
the operational environment by illustrating who and what will be impacted in each unit‟s area of 
responsibility.  It easily describes events in spatial locations, and is part of the analysis 
procedures which identify areas in need.  When controlled and managed properly, the method of 
controlling and managing information ensures that DOS will incessantly be involved in planning 
reoccurring development events and assess reconstruction impacts on the local host-nation 
community.  Furthermore, it implicates DOS as the entity which limits the friction between other 
USG agencies in goals and objectives.  And, most importantly, it provides a single point of 
contact concerning the operational environment and is vital to transposing leadership which 
rotates through deployments. 
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A Comprehensive Model to Reconstruction of Post-Conflict Societies 
Figure  5-5: Comprehensive Planning Model - Part 2. 
 
Source: Adapted from RM Plan Group (1998) by Author (2010). 
Isolated from the rest of the model, Figure  5-5: Comprehensive Planning Model - Part 2 
(above) demonstrates the rational planning process in a post-conflict operational environment.  
This section demonstrates through the vertical headings a need to obtain information, prioritize 
it, develop goals, develop alternatives, implement a plan, and evaluate and re-implement 
procedures where necessary.  Through the horizontal headings are elements necessary to 
complete each task.  Each element must be seen for its context to the situation.  There must be 
flexibility implemented in the process, but done so to grounded and familiar components.  The 
elements take into account those actions which look to create stability in a post-conflict society. 
The model takes on a whole of government approach and combines it with participation 
of the host-nation to instill a true unity of effort, all the while being maintained through DOS.  
Through this model basic human needs are addressed (food, water, shelter, sanitation, and 
healthcare) and FM 3-07s Five Primary Stability Tasks (security, justice, humanitarian, 
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governance, and infrastructure) are approached.  This section empowers the host-nation by 
linking them through the reconstruction teams to the DOS.  It adds a balance to the decision 
making power that embraces opinions and directions from those who are most impacted by 
reconstruction efforts, the local host-nation community.   
Reconstruction teams, which are in constant contact with the host-nation and DOS, apply 
post-conflict reconstruction efforts through communication, community involvement, 
professional experience/education, and DOS guidance.  These teams comprise the whole of 
government approach set out by NSPD-44 and are the mechanisms by which the DOS plan is 
enforced to work towards goals.  They are, simply, all USG agencies, to which the US Army has 
currently made the largest contribution to. 
The process illustrated here closely resembles the MDMP, and is not only familiar to the 
US Army, but other DOD agencies as well (as a matter of fact, this process is the basic approach 
to the scientific model used to solve issues).  It is in this section that local community goals are 
derived through host-nation participation, a capacity-building assessment is completed, and a 
preliminary plan is developed.  The information collected here is then retained by DOS, to be 
used to produce a comprehensive report on the entire host-nation which can assess reconstruction 
impacts and help determine gaps in community development.  This model is important because it 
organizes efforts, it includes host-nation participation, and it provides a means to assess current 
efforts, allowing adjustments to be made where necessary.  It provides the link that legitimizes 
host-nation authority by having them represented through trained reconstruction team leaders. 
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Partnering with Local Host-Nation 
Figure  5-6: Comprehensive Planning Model - Part 3. 
 
Source: Adapted from RM Plan Group (1998) by Author (2010). 
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Appendix A - USAID Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development describes partnership 
as the ability to collaborate with all organizations within the operational environment.  As part of 
the proposed Comprehensive Planning Model for US Army Reconstruction Teams, partnership 
must be both recognized and respected, and especially so amongst the host-nation participation.  
Figure  5-6: Comprehensive Planning Model - Part 3 emphasizes partnership as collaboration, 
and most definitely not the fulfillment of a host-nation „wish-list‟.  This, above all other efforts 
of communication, must be realized by the reconstruction team leadership.  He/she must 
understand that they are fulfilling specific mission requirements that are unique to the nation-
building discipline and instill certain ethics and values.  The US Army reconstruction team 
leader must be assertive and partner with the local host-nation to develop a balance of ideas that 
are important or essential to the community, and to the well-being of all of society.   
In this, the host-nation must be involved in the redevelopment of their community, but 
they cannot be the decision makers of how US resources are allocated.  They should have an 
influence on direction, but must be reinforced that reconstruction teams are allocated to support 
human-rights to instill security.  The team leader must investigate community information and 
develop a priority list of achievable objectives, and then bring this list for discussion to the 
community or community leadership.  As illustrated, this list can be mitigated by the 
reconstruction teams, and should so since it‟s inconceivable to expect the DOS to accomplish all 
elements of reconstruction progress.   
Rational Urban Planning Model 
Figure  5-7: Comprehensive Planning Model - Part 4. 
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Source: Adapted from RM Plan Group (1998) by Author (2010). 
The rational urban planning model, illustrated in Figure  5-7: Comprehensive Planning 
Model - Part 4 (above), is the means US urban planners use to create a process that limits 
uncontrollable effects, and balances the methods to solving issues fairly among citizens.  The 
components of the comprehensive planning model for US Army reconstruction teams are 
blended by the rational planning process.  As the comprehensive planning model is implemented, 
it can be correlated to the rational planning process for familiarity of the MDMP. 
The rational model is offered in the comprehensive planning model as a support tool that 
demonstrates the flow of decision making.  It shows that the comprehensive planning model is 
encompassed by familiar methods to derive a course of action.  As a supplement, it is a reminder 
that planning reconstruction efforts occurs in a logical and rational method that is adhered to by 
large functioning organizations such as the US Army and other USG agencies.  Furthermore, it 
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illustrates that the reconstruction team is, quite literally, the passage from post-conflict to 
stability.  It requires that reconstruction teams adhere to and implement specific procedures that 
are both measurable and transposable.   
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Appendix A - USAID Nine Principles of Reconstruction and 
Development 
1. Ownership 
Build on the leadership, participation, and commitment of a country and its people.   
2. Capacity-Building 
Strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills, and promote appropriate policies.   
3. Sustainability 
Design programs to ensure their impact endures.   
4. Selectivity 
Allocate resources based on need, local commitment, and foreign policy interests.   
5. Assessment 
Conduct careful research, adapt best practices, and design for local conditions.   
6. Results 
Focus resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable and strategically-focused 
objectives.   
7. Partnership 
Collaborate closely with governments, communities, donors, NGOs, the private sector, 
international organizations, and universities.   
8. Flexibility 
Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities, and maximize efficiency.   
9. Accountability 
Design accountability and transparency into systems and build effective checks and 
balances to guard against corruption.  
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Appendix B - PRT Occupational Functions 
 A PRT Team Leader is a member of the DOS and serves as the 
primary advisor to Provincial Reconstruction Development 
Committees on reconstruction issues.  The PRT Team Leader 
will initiate and assists host-nation local governance to 
prioritize necessary actions to ensure stability.  He or she also 
prepares reconstruction situation reports for their assigned 
area and oversees the management of the team’s inter-
agency resources. 
 The Deputy Team Leader is generally a Lieutenant Colonel or 
Colonel and is the Chief of Staff to the PRT Team Leader.  He 
or she approves security measures for PRT operations, is the 
liaison to the military force in the area of which they reside, 
and coordinates the day-to-day activities of the inter-agencies. 
 A Multinational Force Liaison Officer is a senior ranking DOD 
officer who is responsible for initiating security measures for 
PRT convoys and operations.  He or she collects the 
intelligence of the area to brief the Deputy Team Leader and 
coordinates emergency responses in case of attacks.   
 The Department of Justice provides a Rule of Law Coordinator 
to advise the US Embassy on how PRTs are responding to 
host-nation government issues.  He or she also provides 
guidance to host-nation government officials concerning 
judicial issues and reports to the Embassy on the progress of 
the local judicial system. 
 A Provincial Action Officer is a DOS official who is the reporting 
officer that meets with host-nation authorities and reports to 
Embassy officials’ weekly progress.  He or she is the subject 
matter expert on host-nation politics and economic 
development.  They meet with local officials and private 
citizens to support the PRT Team Leader decision-making. 
 The Public Diplomacy Officer, who is also employed by the 
DOS, is a public affairs administrator who exploits the PRTs 
successes.  He or she shares the responsibility of coordinating 
meetings between PRT leadership and host-nation officials.   
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 The USDA provides an Agriculture Advisor who develops 
agriculture assistance programs for the host-nation. 
 The Army Corps of Engineers provides Engineers to train and 
advise the host-nation engineers on PRT projects.  The 
engineer also provides assessments of infrastructure, 
contractual scope-of-work objectives for host-nation 
contractors, and project management.  This person supports 
the information provided to PRT Team and Deputy Leader of 
‘on the ground’ projects.   
 The Development Officer is employed by the USAID.  This 
representative works with host-nation leaders to increase 
economic and infrastructure viability.  He or she coordinates 
their activities with the PRT to develop and coordinate a PRT 
work plan.  He or she is also the subject matter expert on 
USAID Principles of Reconstruction and Development and 
counsels the PRT Team and Deputy Leader. 
 A Governance Team is a three person team contracted 
through the USAID.  These teams provide PRTs “hands-on 
training in the provision of public services, finance, accounting 
and personnel management” (FM 3-07, F-27). 
 The US Army provides Civil Affairs teams, who make up the 
largest component of the PRTs.  These teams are generally US 
Army Reserve soldiers with special skill sets, unique to their 
civilian jobs.  If a Civil Affairs team member is a Police Officer 
in his civilian occupation, he or she will most likely be utilized 
to a Rule of Law team to support the Department of Justice 
official. 
 The Bilingual Biculture Advisor is a DOD contractor, who is 
usually an expatriate.  This person is the main contact 
between PRT personnel and host-nation leadership.  They are 
advisors of cultural and society issues, and maintain a college 
degree. 
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Appendix C - United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 
 
Article 1. 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.  They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.   
 
Article 2. 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.  Furthermore, no distinction shall be 
made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or 
territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or 
under any other limitation of sovereignty.   
 
Article 3. 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.   
 
Article 4. 
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be 
prohibited in all their forms.   
 
Article 5. 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.   
 
Article 6. 
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.   
 
Article 7. 
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal 
protection of the law.  All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation 
of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.   
 
Article 8. 
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.   
 
Article 9. 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.   
 
Article 10. 
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Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge 
against him.   
Article 11. 
(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary 
for his defence.   
(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when 
it was committed Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at 
the time the penal offence was committed.   
 
Article 12. 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.   
 
Article 13. 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of 
each state.   
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his 
country.   
 
Article 14. 
(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution.   
(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-
political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.   
 
Article 15. 
(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.   
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change 
his nationality.   
 
Article 16. 
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or 
religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.  They are entitled to equal rights as to 
marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.   
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending 
spouses.   
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State.   
 
Article 17. 
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(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.   
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.   
 
 
 
Article 18. 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, 
worship and observance.   
 
Article 19. 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.   
 
Article 20. 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.   
(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.   
 
Article 21. 
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives.   
(2) Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.   
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and 
shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.   
 
Article 22. 
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to 
realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the 
organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights 
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.   
 
Article 23. 
(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable 
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.   
(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.   
(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for 
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, 
by other means of social protection.   
(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests.   
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Article 24. 
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working 
hours and periodic holidays with pay.   
 
 
 
 
Article 25. 
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being 
of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.   
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance.  All children, 
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.   
 
Article 26. 
(1) Everyone has the right to education.  Education shall be free, at least in the 
elementary and fundamental stages.  Elementary education shall be compulsory.  Technical and 
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally 
accessible to all on the basis of merit.   
(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to 
the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.  It shall promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall 
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.   
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their 
children.   
 
Article 27. 
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to 
enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.   
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting 
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.   
 
Article 28. 
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.   
 
Article 29. 
(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development 
of his personality is possible.   
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.   
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(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations.   
 
Article 30. 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any 
of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.
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Appendix D - Haiti Reconstruction Mapping Efforts 
Source: European Commission Joint Research Center 2010. 
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Residential Houses Damage 
Significant 
number of 
collapsed 
dwelling units. 
Source: Quickbird 2003, copyright Digitalglobe. 
 
Source: Geoeye 2010, copyright GeoEye. 
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Appendix E – Map‎of‎Afghanistan‟s‎“Ring‎Road” 
Map Appendix - E: Map of Afghanistan‟s "Ring Road" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Atlantic, McClatchy Washington Bureau 2009. 
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Appendix F – Physical Infrastructure Discrepancies in Iraq 
 
Kinks in the railroad system network are common.  Iraq struggles to keep 
railroad materials from being looted and the network itself maintained. 
Source: Bechtel Corporation, 2003. 
 
Reconstruction teams are often charged with organizing the repair of 
equipment, such as this train axel which is missing the brake block, oil 
feed, and axel cover.  Source: Bechtel Corporation, 2003. 
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Iraq power infrastructure has been the target of destruction and looting, 
such as this Substation Control System.  Source: Bechtel Corporation, 2003. 
 
 
Water/wastewater infrastructure are often illegally tapped, exposed, or 
have leaks which introduce disease into the community.  Source: Bechtel 
Corporation, 2003. 
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Most bridges along major transportation routes need special repairs which 
Iraqis are unable to accommodate.  Source: Bechtel Corporation, 2003. 
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